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introduction 
By Jeroen cuvelier
resource governance and state fragility in the Drc
Non-industrial mining, carried out by vast numbers of men, women and children working for 
themselves, is rising fast in resource-rich Third World countries such as the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. In 2003, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) provided direct employment to 
an estimated 11.5 million to 13 million people around the world1. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
processes of globalisation, economic liberalisation and political transformation have helped to 
generate unprecedented interest in mineral resources on the part of impoverished ordinary people, 
entrepreneurs, traders, rebels and badly paid army officers2. Hundreds of thousands of prospective 
workers have travelled to artisanal mining sites in the hope of finding a new source of income3.
In spite of its spectacular expansion, however, ASM has not shaken off its negative reputation 
among policymakers and development specialists. The sector is frequently presented as 
technologically backward and inefficient, with limited potential for poverty reduction. Moreover, 
these circles assume the sector is almost ungovernable due to the large number of actors involved, 
the lack of binding property rights for artisanal miners, the virtual absence of written contracts 
and the inherently ephemeral nature of artisanal digging activities. Since those attracted to 
artisanal mining are predominantly young people - many of them from poor backgrounds - these 
commentators suspect that the potential for conflict in artisanal mining areas is relatively high4.
Eager to get a firmer grip on the sector, several donor bodies and international institutions have 
made considerable efforts to formalise ASM activities and to improve the livelihoods of artisanal 
miners. The World Bank has provided financial support to countries such as Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania, with a view to encouraging their ASM 
sectors to take on more formal trappings. Meanwhile, the European Union, the International 
Labour Organisation and the UN Industrial Development Organisation have financed projects 
in the fields of environmental management, labour, alternative livelihoods and technological 
development5.
Unfortunately, these policy interventions have not always yielded the desired results. The main 
explanation for this appears to be insufficient insight into what really goes on in the mining areas 
and the trading centres. It is vitally important that initiatives aimed at reforming the artisanal 
mining industry are based on a thorough knowledge and grasp of the political, economic and 
social dynamics at the grassroots level. As Hilson has rightly pointed out, ‘a poor understanding 
of artisanal, mine-community dynamics and operators’ needs has, in a number of cases, led to the 
design and implementation of inappropriate support schemes and interventions’6.
1 ‘Why is artisanal gold mining activity so ubiquitous in rural Ghana’, Gavin hilson & Clive potter (2003), in: African Development Bank: p. 240. 
2 ‘artisanal gold mining at the margins of mineral resource governance: a case from tanzania’, eleonor fisher (2008), in: Development 
Southern Africa, vol. 25, nr. 2: p. 199. 
3 ‘Small-scale mining, rural subsistence and poverty in West Africa’, Gavin hilson (ed.) (2006), Warwickshire: practical action; ‘Citizens, 
subjects or a dual mandate? artisanal miners, ‘supporters’ and the resource scramble in sierra Leone’, sylvia ojukutu-Macauley & andrew 
K. Keili (2008), in: Development Southern Africa, vol. 25, nr. 5: pp. 513-530; ‘Mining in Africa: regulation and development’, bonnie Campbell 
(ed.) (2009), uppsala: nordic africa institute. 
4 ‘building peace with conflict diamonds? Merging security and development in sierra Leone’, philippe Le billon & estelle Levin (2009), in: 
development and Change, vol. 40, nr. 4: pp. 698-700. 
5 ‘What is wrong with the Global support facility for small-scale mining?’ Gavin hilson (2007), in: Progress in Development Studies, vol. 7, nr. 
3: pp. 236-237. 
6 ‘What is wrong with the Global support facility for small-scale mining?’ Gavin hilson (2007), in: Progress in Development Studies, vol. 7, nr. 
3: p. 235. 
8 international alert
The aim of this research report is to analyse the trading networks within the mining sector 
and their links to military, economic and political actors in eastern DRC. Although a host of 
publications over the last decade have highlighted the important role played by coltan, gold and 
cassiterite in the region’s ongoing conflict, there is still little awareness of the modus operandi of 
the various actors involved in the exploitation and trade of these minerals. More information is 
needed about the ways in which people at different levels of the commodity chain operate against 
the backdrop of state fragility. 
Contrary to common assumptions, state fragility is not synonymous with anarchy or chaos. It 
is not because a state is fragile that there are no forms of governance at the local level7. When 
formal government institutions are absent, ineffective or illegitimate, their place is frequently 
taken – either partly or entirely - by non-state actors such as international institutions, non-
governmental organisations and even private companies8. So, even though Congo is generally 
considered a prototypical example of a fragile state – it has lost control over part of its territory, 
fails to offer decent public services to its citizens and has a malfunctioning administration9 
– this does not necessarily mean that natural resource governance in eastern DRC is non-
existent. 
In the following sections, we will discuss in more detail which geographical areas have been 
targeted, which research themes have been covered, and what kinds of data have been collected.
geographical focus
As far as the geographical focus of this study is concerned, we have chosen to concentrate 
on regions in eastern DRC where artisanal mining is a significant economic activity, pushing 
people out of agricultural employment and offering political, economic and military players an 
opportunity to generate more revenue for themselves. The areas concerned are the provinces of 
North and South Kivu, and Ituri in Orientale Province. 
Ituri deserves attention because it holds important gold deposits and has a sizeable population 
of artisanal miners. It has also been the scene of bloody confrontations between various armed 
groups in the past, an additional motive for investigation. Reports by Human Rights Watch10, 
Amnesty International11 and International Crisis Group12 have documented how Ugandan and 
Rwandan forces as well as local militias such as the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) have 
benefited from Ituri’s gold in the Second Congo War, from 1998 to 2003. 
Just like Ituri, North and South Kivu are resource-rich regions with high levels of insecurity 
and human rights violations. While the Kivus contain significant deposits of coltan, cassiterite, 
wolframite (tungsten) and gold, both the ordinary population and people working in the 
mines suffer various types of abuse and harassment from armed groups. The fragility of the 
state in these two war-torn provinces makes it essential to investigate the issue of resource 
governance13. 
7 ‘The power of protection: governance and transborder trade on the Congo-Ugandan frontier’, timothy raeymaekers (2007), unpublished phd 
dissertation, university of Ghent. 
8 ‘Local governance in fragile states’, helen Maria Kyed & Lars engberg-pedersen (2008), diis policy brief (fragile situations). 
9 ‘public service provision in a failed state: looking beyond predation in the democratic republic of Congo’, theodore trefon (2009), in: 
Review of African Political Economy, nr. 119: pp. 9-21. 
10 ‘”Covered in blood”: ethnically targeted violence in Northeastern DR Congo’, human rights Watch (2003). 
11 ‘On the precipice: the deepening human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri’, amnesty international (2003). 
12 ‘Congo crisis: military intervention in Ituri’, international Crisis Group (2003), africa report nr. 64. 
13 ‘Blood minerals: the criminalization of the mining industry of eastern DRC’, pole institute, august 2010. 
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research Themes
With regard to the main research themes in this report, we have decided to concentrate our 
attention on three topics: (1) the modus operandi of mineral trading networks, (2) the impact of 
the local political economy on the mining sector, and (3) the militarisation of the mining sector. 
The modus operandi of mineral trading networks
What do we mean by mineral trading networks and why is it important to examine their modus 
operandi? Readers should bear in mind that eastern DRC’s mining sector cannot be adequately 
understood without taking into account the inherently regional nature of the mineral trade in this 
part of Sub-Saharan Africa. Before reaching their final destination, minerals extracted in eastern 
DRC have to pass through one of the country’s neighbours, such as Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania 
or Uganda14. 
The transfer of substantial quantities of minerals from artisanal mines in the Congolese interior to 
the coast of the Indian Ocean (and beyond) requires the involvement of a large number of people 
operating along various trading routes. Since these people usually work together in a close and 
regular manner - that is to say, their cooperation is not limited to a single transaction - it seems 
fitting to conceive of them as networks. 
Our motives for examining the modus operandi of the networks involved in eastern DRC’s 
mineral trade are twofold. First of all, we believe that national and international initiatives to 
reform the artisanal mining business in eastern DRC can only succeed if guided by a clear idea 
of who is doing what and how, not only at the downstream level of the supply chain but also 
at the upstream level. Policymakers need a thorough understanding of the roles of the various 
actors involved in the mining and trading of Congolese minerals. Detailed, up-to-date knowledge 
of how the mining business works is absolutely essential for any future policy interventions to be 
effective. 
Secondly, we think it is crucial to have descriptions of the mineral trading networks in the Great 
Lakes area of central Africa at regular intervals, because these networks are known to adapt fairly 
rapidly to changing political and economic conditions in the region. As time goes by, networks are 
likely to undergo changes, new actors become involved, new alliances are formed and new trading 
strategies emerge. Regular research and documentation of the mining trade in eastern DRC will 
help us to understand trends and developments far better.
The impact of the local political economy on the mining sector
The second theme that we intend to explore in this report is the impact of eastern DRC’s political 
economy on the local mining sector. It goes without saying that mining and trading minerals does 
not take place in a vacuum. Both activities are heavily affected by the political and economic 
agendas of influential actors in eastern DRC15. Taking advantage of the ongoing lack of peace 
and public order in the east, several members of local elites have used their involvement in the 
mining business to develop and sustain patron-client relationships: they have used their mining 
revenues to reward supporters and followers for their loyalty16. In a number of cases, leaders of 
armed groups have also used mineral revenues to buy military equipment on the international 
market or pay foot soldiers. 
That being said, it is important to emphasise that the primary aim of this report is not to reveal 
unknown cases of illicit resource extraction financing war. Neither is our intention to unveil 
new cases of corruption in the mining business. Our desire is for the case studies in this report 
14 ‘Voices from the inside: local views on mining reform in eastern DR Congo’, swedwatch & finnwatch (2010): p. 10. 
15 ‘identity, space and the political economy of conflict in Central africa’, Kevin dunn (2005), in: ‘The geopolitics of resource wars: governance 
and violence’, philippe Le billon (ed.) (2005), London/ new york: frank Cass: p. 246. 
16 ‘democratic republic of the Congo: undoing government by predation’, edward rackley (2006), in: Disasters, vol. 30, nr. 4: pp. 417-432. 
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to illustrate and analyse some of the mechanisms and patterns observed in the field of resource 
governance in eastern DRC.
militarisation of the mining sector
The third and final theme of this research report is the militarisation of the mining sector in eastern 
DRC. In order to understand this, we must take into account the longstanding inefficiencies of the 
Congolese army as well as the lack of progress in reforming the country’s security sector. Plans 
to reform the Congolese security sector were first made in 2002, towards the end of the second 
Congolese war. The Global and Inclusive Peace Agreement stipulated that the armed forces of all 
signatories automatically became soldiers of the new Congolese army FARDC (Forces Armées 
de la République Démocratique du Congo). Subsequently, they had a choice between joining the 
voluntary national programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration - which was 
supposed to help them reintegrate into civilian life - or stepping into the new structure of the 
Congolese national army17. 
The process of military integration was called brassage or “intermingling”. The aim of brassage 
was to bring all soldiers – not just the pro-government forces, but also those of former rebel 
movements and militias – together into one single army. Members of the new army were to be 
re-trained, re-equipped and made to comply with the new hierarchy.18. 
Unfortunately, brassage has not gone as smoothly as one would have wished. Apart from the 
fact that it has suffered from underfunding and slow implementation, the process has also been 
accused of inadequate training, under-equipment and insufficient screening of new recruits. The 
problems were exacerbated by the accelerated integration of two large groups of former rebels 
in 2009.
The militarisation of the mining sector undermines the efficiency of security sector reform because 
soldiers and military officers are more focused on their interests in the mineral trade than on 
carrying out military orders. Following the example of Zairian soldiers during the era of Joseph 
Désiré Mobutu, who amassed vast personal wealth during his presidency, unpaid members of 
the FARDC extort their “salary and benefits” from the Congolese population19. They impose 
illegal taxes on people working in the mining areas, subject them to forced labour and forcefully 
take possession of the most productive pits in the mine. Needless to say, all these practices are 
completely at odds with the spirit of security sector reform.
The case studies in this report contain recent data on the involvement of state and non-state 
armed actors in the mining trade of eastern DRC. The research shows that military officers and 
their subordinates continue to view the mining sector as one of their principal supplementary 
sources of income. In order to demilitarise the mining sector, both the Congolese government and 
international donors will need to do everything within their power to put security sector reform 
back on track.
methodology
In order to collect data for this research report, three research teams of two people each visited 
one of the three research areas (Ituri, North Kivu or South Kivu) to conduct semi-structured 
interviews with various stakeholders in the mining trade of eastern DRC. In the following sections, 
we discuss some of the methodological obstacles this research project encountered.
17 ‘Security sector reform in the Congo’, international Crisis Group (2006), africa report nr. 104. 
18 ‘Demilitarizing mining areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: the case of Northern Katanga province’, ruben de Koning, sipri insights 
on peace and security, nr. 2010/1: p. 8. 
19 ‘democratic republic of the Congo: undoing government by predation’, edward rackley (2006), in: Disasters, vol. 30, nr. 4: p. 421. 
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Difficulty obtaining reliable quantitative data
One of the challenges of research in a state as fragile as the Democratic Republic of Congo is the 
difficulty in obtaining reliable information on economic transactions. This is not only due to the 
lack or absence of official data and statistics20, but also to the fraudulent practices that pervade 
public administration21. For instance, goods may cross the border under the cover of falsified 
export documents. In such cases, customs officers may either change the identity, the value or the 
quantity of the goods on the official forms in order to allow the exporter to evade certain taxes. 
Given the widespread nature of this type of fraud throughout the Great Lakes region, researchers 
studying cross-border trade should be aware that a substantial part of international trade flows 
does not show up in official statistics22. 
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the contributors to this volume have still decided to gather 
as much statistical material as possible. First of all, collecting Congolese statistical information 
can pave the way for interesting comparative research at the regional level. A comparison of 
Congolese import and export data with similar data from neighbouring countries provides a 
good impression of trade flows across the entire region23. Secondly, statistical information from 
various sources inside the DRC can be vitally important in detecting unofficial trade flows. When 
various government agencies turn out to have different figures for the same trade flow, this is a 
good reason to suspect fraud24. 
security risks
It goes without saying that research on mining issues in eastern DRC is extremely risky. In the 
course of this project, the contributors to this volume were confronted with a volatile military 
situation in the Congolese interior on top of their remit to investigate a highly sensitive topic. 
After the publication of several reports by expert panels of the United Nations and NGOs such as 
Global Witness, few people are willing to talk openly about what goes on in the mining business. 
While some people are afraid of reprisals if they dare to denounce certain abuses, others prefer to 
remain silent because they do not want to jeopardise the lives of people around them.
Nonetheless, the importance of the security situation in eastern DRC for the feasibility of the 
research project should not be exaggerated. As Vlassenroot has rightly pointed out in an article on 
the challenges of doing fieldwork in the Kivu region, successful research does not only depend on 
the level of insecurity, but also on the researcher’s contacts with local actors or partners (among 
other things)25. In the following sections, we explain how Congolese researchers were deployed 
for this research project.
The need to work with local partners
Research on mineral trade and exploitation in eastern DRC has proved to be impossible without 
the assistance of local people26. It is only thanks to the help of Congolese researchers that the 
contributors to this volume managed to gain the confidence of informants in a wide variety of 
contexts, ranging from mining zones in the Congolese interior to trading houses in cities such as 
Goma and Bukavu. It should be noted that we prioritised partnerships with individuals who had 
20 ‘War and social research: the limits of empirical methodologies in war-torn environments’, Koen vlassenroot (2006), in: Civilisations, vol. 
54, nrs. 1-2: pp. 196-197. 
21 ‘everyday corruption and the state: citizens and public officials in africa’, Giorgio blundo & Jean-pierre olivier de sardan (eds.) (2006), 
London: Zed books. 
22 ‘Les mesures de la dissimulation: les méthodes de recherche en sciences sociales face à la falsification de l’économie congolaise’, benjamin 
rubbers (2006), in: Civilisations, vol. 54, nrs. 1-2: p. 58. 
23 ‘Les mesures de la dissimulation: les méthodes de recherche en sciences sociales face à la falsification de l’économie congolaise’, 
benjamin rubbers (2006), in: Civilisations, vol. 54, nrs. 1-2: p. 59. 
24 ‘research on sub-saharan africa’s unrecorded international trade: some methodological and conceptual problems’, stephen ellis & Janet 
MacGaffey (1996), in: African Studies Review, vol. 39, nr. 2: p. 28.
25 ‘War and social research: the limits of empirical methodologies in war-torn environments’, Koen vlassenroot (2006), in: Civilisations, vol. 
54, nrs. 1-2: pp. 192-193. 
26 ‘research on sub-saharan africa’s unrecorded international trade: some methodological and conceptual problem’s, stephen ellis & Janet 
MacGaffey (1996), in: African Studies Review, vol. 39, nr. 2: p. 25. 
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already worked for us on previous occasions. We knew that these people could be trusted, that 
they had a large number of contacts in the mining sector and that they had excellent research 
and writing skills. We remained in close contact after our return from the field, which gave us the 
opportunity to fill some of the remaining gaps in our research and allowed us to keep abreast of 
the latest developments in the mining sector27.
chapter overview 
The report is divided into 11 chapters. In chapter 1, Dan Fahey presents an analysis of the gold 
trade in the Ituri district of the Orientale Province. He sheds interesting light on the modus 
operandi of gold trading networks by zooming in on the interaction between various actors at the 
bottom end of the supply chain. Furthermore, he suggests that the activities of these actors take 
place in a grey zone between legality and illegality. It is clear from Fahey’s analysis that the gold 
trade in Ituri is still largely unofficial and unrecorded.
In chapter 2, Dan Fahey takes a look at what the Congolese government is currently doing to 
formalise the gold trade in the Ituri district. He shows that attempts to transform the unofficial 
nature of the gold trade have not yet produced the desired results. According to Fahey, the 
government should develop incentives to encourage traders to buy and sell gold in a more legal and 
transparent manner. In addition, the authorities should be prepared to deal with the consequences 
of a future clash between industrial and artisanal mining in Ituri. Forceful evictions of artisanal 
miners are likely to cause severe tensions and conflicts.
In chapter 3, Sara Geenen takes us to Butembo, an important gold trading centre in North Kivu. 
She reports that the “name and shame” reports of NGOs and expert panels of the United Nations 
have had a negative effect on the mineral trade in this part of eastern DRC: gold traders feel 
stigmatised and criminalised by the international community and, as a result, are not prepared 
to support initiatives aimed at making the trade more transparent. Geenen argues that reform 
initiatives by the Congolese government are not only hampered by the lack of cooperation from 
the gold traders, but also by the local administration’s lack of capacity.
In chapter 4, Sebastien Melmoth28 describes how mining and trade in cassiterite in the territory 
of Walikale, North Kivu, is marred by the militarisation of the mining sector and unequal power 
relations at the mines. The chapter provides a clear description of the complexity of resource 
governance at the grassroots level. 
In chapter 5, Ruben de Koning analyses the modus operandi of members of gold trading networks 
operating along the axis of Bukavu-Uvira-Bujumbura. De Koning’s findings confirm that the gold 
trade in eastern DRC largely escapes government control. His analysis also throws into relief the 
negative implications of the militarisation of the mining sector: there are indications that officers 
of the Congolese national army are heavily involved in illegal gold trafficking, and it also appears 
that non-state armed groups such as the FDLR are using the gold trade to finance their war effort. 
Just like in Ituri, efforts of the Congolese government to formalise the gold trade have remained 
fruitless so far.
In chapter 6, Ruben de Koning concentrates on the mining and trade in cassiterite along the 
Lulingu-Nzovu-Nzibira axis. He demonstrates that military campaigns against extremist Hutu 
forces have not made the mines in this area “conflict free”. The militarisation of the mining sector 
continues to be a serious problem.
27 for a list of contacts, see the annexes to this report. 
28 this is a pseudonym. for security reasons, the author prefers to conceal his real identity. 
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In chapter 7, Jeroen Cuvelier takes the example of the mine of Nyabibwe to illustrate the complex 
conflict dynamics at the grassroots level. He argues that policymakers attempting to solve the 
problem of “conflict minerals” should look closely at the region’s history and the sociocultural 
context in which mining activities take place. The case study on Nyabibwe shows that the 
relationship between artisanal mining and conflict in eastern DRC cannot be properly understood 
without taking into account the issues of land, identity, legal pluralism and migration.
In chapter 8, Cuvelier examines the relationship between artisanal mining and conflict on the 
island of Idjwi. The chapter suggests that it is important to take into account the role of traditional 
customary authorities in the mining business in eastern DRC. It also shows that further research 
is needed on the interplay between traditional land tenure systems and artisanal mining activities 
in this part of the country.
Finally, chapters 9 and 10, written by Rachel Perks, Koen Vlassenroot and Jason Stearns, describe 
some of the implications of this report’s research findings for future policy initiatives.
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chapter 1: The informal Trade in ituri’s gold 
By Dan fahey
This case study concerns the unofficial gold trade in the Ituri district, with a focus on the trade 
operating through Bunia. We highlight recent trends, including new actors and new destinations 
for Ituri’s gold.
1.1 gold production in ituri
Gold production in Ituri is mainly artisanal, with some semi-industrial production. Regulation of 
gold production has been shared since November 2009 between the national Office des Mines de 
Kilo Moto (OKIMO), the government of Orientale province and SAESSCAM (Service d’Assistance 
et d’Encadrement du Small-scale and Artisanal Mining, a technical service of the national mines 
ministry). OKIMO sells licenses for gold mining within its concession (Concession 38 in Haut-
Uélé, and Concessions 39 and 40 in Ituri).
According to the provincial mines ministry, in 2009 there were approximately 123,000 artisanal 
miners in Ituri, working at approximately 235 sites. As the following table shows, the vast 
majority of these miners are in Concession 40, in western Djugu territory.
TaBle : estimates of artisanal miners, mining sites, and négociants  in ituri District, 200929
artisanal Miners Mining sites  négociants 
Mambasa 10,000 45 90
irumu 6,000 30 60
djugu 100,000 150 80
Mahagi 4,000 7 10
aru 3,000 3 50
ToTal 123,000 235 290
A number of semi-industrial mining operations are either planned or under way in Ituri district; 
many of the active sites involve dredges (alluvial mining). One of the companies using dredges is La 
Conmet Ltd, which a UN Panel of Experts has identified as having traded in coltan during the war30. 
There are also several companies planning industrial-scale operations in Ituri. Kilo Goldmines 
Ltd, a Canadian mining company, is currently exploring for gold in Mambasa territory, although 
information on the company’s website suggests it also holds the rights to explore for diamonds 
and gold in Irumu Territory.31 Mwana Africa Plc, a South African mining company, is exploring 
for gold in Mahagi territory, within OKIMO’s Concession 39.32 Ashanti Goldfields Kilo (AGK), 
a joint venture between South African mining company Anglogold Ashanti (86.22 percent stake) 
and OKIMO (13.78 percent stake),33 is planning to dig a large pit mine near Mongbwalu in 
29 ‘Rapport Annuel, Exercice 2009’, bureau Minier isole de district de l’ituri’, 15 January 2010: pp. 6-7. 
30 s/2002/1146: §109-111; ‘Network war: an introduction to Congo’s privatized war economy’, timothy raeymaekers (2002), the hague: novib 
report.
31 see http://www.kilogold.net/properties/, accessed on 5th august 2010.
32 ‘Updated gold resource estimate at Zani-Kodo’, press release Mwana africa plc, 28th July 2010 (source: http://www.mwanaafrica.com/ir/
press/2010/press_28jul10.asp, accessed on 5th august 2010.
33 ‘AngloGold Ashanti enters definitive joint venture with OKIMO regarding the AGK Project in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, press release 
angloGold ashanti (source: http://www.anglogold.com/additional/press/2010/Jv+agreement+with+okimo.htm, accessed on 5th august 
2010).
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OKIMO’s Concession 40, starting perhaps in 2011. The Kibali Gold Project in Concession 39 
(formerly known as the Moto Gold) is a joint venture between foreign companies AngloGold 
Ashanti and Randgold (90 percent combined stake), and OKIMO (10 percent stake).34
The levels of production in Ituri are difficult to ascertain. Many officials and traders mention a 
figure of 500 kg per month for production from both Ituri and Haut-Uélé, with approximately 
60 percent (300 kg) from Ituri and 40 percent (200 kg) from Haut-Uélé; however, there is no 
apparent basis for this number. Time constraints prevented this report’s researchers from travelling 
to Aru/Ariwara, so we have no current information on amounts of gold traded in those towns or 
estimates of how much of that originates in Ituri.
1.2 structure of the Trade
Gold trading in Ituri happens in several stages. First, négociants acquire gold in Ituri’s gold mining 
areas. Second, gold produced in Ituri and neighbouring Haut-Uélé district is traded in Ituri’s main 
trading towns of Bunia and Ariwara. Third, négociants export gold from Ituri to Butembo (North 
Kivu), Kampala (Uganda), and Juba (Southern Sudan). 
1.2.1 mining and processing sites
Some gold is traded directly at mining and processing sites. Minor négociants or the representatives 
of major négociants visit mining and processing sites, particularly sites that are far from trading 
centres like Mongbwalu. In some cases, pit bosses or individual miners sell their gold to négociants 
who had provided financing for materials such as generators and fuel. In other cases, individual 
miners who process their own quartz may sell directly to négociants at processing sites.
1.2.2 mongbwalu and other primary trading centres
The next level of trade happens in small trading centres, such as Mongbwalu. Individual miners, 
sous-traitants35 and minor négociants travel to these centres, where they sell their gold to mid-
level négociants or to the representatives of major négociants based in Bunia, Aru/Ariwara, or 
Butembo. In addition to Mongbwalu, other important trading centres are Kobu and Iga Barrière 
within the Kilo belt.
Some mid-level négociants in Mongbwalu and other small trading centres belong to a new, Bunia-
based organisation called L’Association des Négociants d’or (ANORI). ANORI formed in early 
2009 to organise négociants  and to provide a focal point for them to interact with government 
agencies, about taxes, for example. As of July 2010, ANORI claimed to have approximately 100 
members in Ituri. Many are in Bunia, but others are found in or near mining areas.
Bunia
Approximately 50 to 60 négociants operate in Bunia, the main gold trading town in Ituri district. Of 
these, 10 are major négociants  who buy from the smaller négociants and control the vast majority 
of gold exports from Bunia. Eight of these reportedly sell their gold in Kampala, while the other two 
take their gold to Butembo. Some of Bunia’s major négociants  have connections with specific buyers 
in Kampala; others sell their gold to whoever offers the best price. The major négociants transport 
their gold on commercial passenger flights (TMK or CETRACA) between Bunia and Butembo or 
Kampala; some transport gold by road through Mahagi-Paidha and on to Kampala.
34  ‘angloGold/randgold up Moto stake’, reuters, 2 november 2009, (source: http://www.miningmx.com/news/gold_and_silver/anglogold-
randgold-up-moto-stake.htm, accessed on 5th august 2010.
35 the technical translation for sous-traitant is subcontractor, but the term is used locally to identify pit bosses who have legal rights to 
mining sites. 
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There are two export offices (“comptoirs”) operating in Bunia: COPED and OKIMO/MIKUBA. 
Both operate officially, that is to say, with government authorisation and paying government 
taxes. However, the comptoirs reportedly control only a small percent of the overall gold trade 
in Bunia. 
Aru/Ariwara
Aru and Ariwara in Aru territory are trading centres for gold originating in Haut-Uélé. Ariwara 
is approximately 50 km from the border with Sudan and 12 km from the border with Uganda; 
Aru is approximately 15 km southeast of Ariwara. In 2008 there were approximately 30 official 
négociants operating in Ariwara, plus an indeterminate number of unofficial négociants.36 In 
the last few years, approximately 120 kg of gold, mainly from the Moto goldfields in Haut-
Uélé district, may have flowed through Ariwara each month.37 In 2010, there are four major 
gold traders in Aru/Ariwara. While traders reportedly export some gold from to Kampala, some 
traders reportedly now take gold to Juba, Sudan. 
1.3 conclusions
The informal gold trade remains dominant in Ituri. As in the past few years, the vast majority of 
the gold produced in Ituri is traded in Kampala, with a smaller amount still transiting via Butembo. 
However, there are also new destinations for gold traded in Ituri, including Juba, Sudan; Beirut, 
Lebanon; as well as Dubai, India and London. 
36 interviews with several sources in bunia, february 2008. 
37 ‘rules for sale: formal and informal cross-border trade in eastern drC’, dominic Johnson & aloys tegera (2007), Goma: pole institute 
publication: p. 49; ‘researching natural resources and trade flows in the Great Lakes region’, Karen hayes et al. (2007), pact publication: p. 32. 
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chapter 2: government efforts at formalisation and 
implications for future gold Trade 
By Dan fahey
This case study focuses on Congolese government efforts to formalise the gold trade in Ituri, and 
implications for the future of the gold trade, building upon information detailed in the preceding 
chapter. 
2.1 looking forward
The gold trade in Ituri district is in transition. Since 2007, when the UN Mission in Congo 
(MONUC) and FARDC established a fragile peace in Ituri, the provincial and national governments 
have sought to exert greater control over gold production and trade. This attempt at greater 
formalisation has given rise to the return of comptoirs to Bunia and to a move towards industrial 
and semi-industrial mining.
2.1.1 The comptoirs
The return of comptoirs to Bunia is the result of government efforts to formalise, regulate, and 
tax the gold trade in Ituri. This development follows a December 2008 joint decree from the 
DRC ministries of mines and finance, which was intended to make it easier for comptoirs dealing 
in gold, diamonds, cassiterite, wolframite, coltan, and copper to do business legally.38 Changes 
to the law included reductions in fees and taxes. Under the new decree, a comptoir pays export 
taxes of 2.25 percent on the value of its exports, plus 1 percent of the value of mineral purchases. 
The problems that comptoirs in Bunia have experienced demonstrate the obstacles the Congolese 
government faces in formalising the gold trade. Furthermore, relatively low figures for the quantity 
of gold exported by the comptoirs since June 2009 suggest that the vast majority of the gold trade 
remains unofficial and unrecorded.
COPED, which opened in May 2009, was the first official comptoir to set up shop in Bunia since 
the mid-1990s. It operates from a storefront close to MONUSCO House in Bunia. Between June 
and December 2009, COPED exported 60.64 kg of gold (in ingot form), worth $1,577,763 
(current year USD); these exports went to Dubai, London, and India39. 
COPED did not export any gold during the first half of 2010. During July 2010, COPED 
representatives were planning to re-open in August 2010. In addition, officials at OKIMO seem 
hostile to COPED because COPED is buying gold produced in OKIMO’s concession area. One 
OKIMO official asserted COPED was only in business because it had political connections in 
Kinshasa40. This same official said that only OKIMO should be buying the gold produced in its 
concession; however, COPED reportedly bought gold produced both inside and outside the Kilo 
belt, from Mambasa, for example. 
Despite opposition from OKIMO, COPED enjoys a good reputation among négociants 
interviewed for this report. COPED has a reputation for offering good prices and transparency 
(such as allowing the seller to see the measurement of the gold’s quality).  Négociants and non-
OKIMO government officials perceive COPED’s existence as good for creating a competitive 
environment for the gold trade, and remarked that if there were more comptoirs in Bunia there 
would be more competition and better prices. 
38 ‘arrêté interministériel no. 0533/Cab.Min.Mines/01/2008 et no. 275/Cab.Min/finances/2008’, 2nd december 2008.
39 data obtained from local mining administration in bunia, July 2010. 
40 interview with okimo official in bunia, July 2010. 
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The OKIMO/MIKUBA comptoir is a joint venture between OKIMO and Mikuba Mining, which 
is a Lebanese-run company. MIKUBA and OKIMO signed a contract in April 200941, and by 
the year’s end they had offices in Bunia, Nizi, and Mongbwalu. The OKIMO comptoir (as it is 
known locally) first exported gold from Bunia in October 2009. From that time until July 2010, 
the comptoir exported 93.62 kg worth $3,417,396 (current year USD); all exports went to Beirut, 
Lebanon.42
The OKIMO comptoir has experienced a number of problems during 2010. Many négociants 
complain that OKIMO does not offer a good price for gold, or that OKIMO’s price is below what 
the major négociants  offer. In order to secure business, OKIMO lends money to sub-contractors43 
in return for guaranteed buying rights. However, some sub-contractors complain about the strict 
conditions and harsh penalties imposed by OKIMO as part of these agreements. Some négociants 
stated that OKIMO was using a flawed machine to determine gold quality, understating its purity 
by a few percent and decreasing the price. OKIMO reportedly would not allow négociants to see 
measurement of the gold’s quality, fuelling suspicions of wrongdoing44. 
Officials at OKIMO are also concerned about the comptoir. Some officials expressed concerns 
that the businessmen running the operation were not reporting all of their gold purchases and 
exports. Furthermore, OKIMO receives only 1 percent of the export value, which OKIMO 
officials in Bunia do not think is enough45. 
A better way for the Congolese government to formalise the gold trade would be to develop 
coherent policy that would encourage new comptoirs to set up shop in Ituri and provide incentives 
for négociants to sell to those comptoirs. The government could consider reducing taxes so that 
comptoirs could offer better prices and compete with gold buyers in Uganda, where there is zero 
tax on exports. The government also needs to find better ways of keeping tabs on the gold trade. 
The government issues licenses to négociants, but does not monitor their purchases and sales. If the 
government required licensed négociants to supply periodic reports on gold purchases and sales, 
which could be subject to random verification, the government could implement incentives (such 
as reduced fees for compliance) and penalties (such as fines for non-compliance) to encourage 
négociants to sell to official comptoirs. This would bring the trade into the formal economy.
2.1.2 industrial and semi-industrial mining
The post-war resurgence in industrial and semi-industrial mining in Ituri district has several 
implications for the gold trade. Industrial mining by Ashanti Goldfields Kilo (AGK) in the Kilo 
belt (Concession 40) will displace many artisanal miners and potentially reduce the quantity of 
artisanal production in the region as artisanal miners are pushed into less productive areas. The 
resumption of industrial mining has the potential to cause conflict and insecurity, which could 
further impact the gold trade. 
Semi-industrial mining (using backhoes and dredges, for example) is more productive than 
artisanal mining, but its increase in Ituri also threatens to reduce the amount of gold available to 
négociants  because semi-industrial operators often export their gold directly. Government efforts 
to formalise the mining sector will therefore transform the gold trade in years to come.
AGK is a joint venture between South African mining company Anglogold Ashanti and OKIMO46. 
Based on the results of exploratory drilling between 2005 and 2007, AGK estimates there are 
41 interview with okimo official in bunia, July 2010. 
42 Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de Certification (CeeC). Monthly reports covering october 2009 to July 2010.
43 the sous-traitants obtain contractual rights from oKiMo to operate pit mines.
44 interviews with local negociants and oKiMo officials in bunia, July 2010.
45 interview with okimo official in bunia, July 2010. 
46 ‘angloGold ashanti enters definitive joint venture agreement with oKiMo regarding the aGK project in the democratic republic of Congo’, 
angloGold ashanti press release, 26th March 2010 (source: www.anglogold.co.za/additional/press/2010/Jv+agreement+with+okimo.htm, 
accessed on 21st december 2010). 
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83,000 kg of gold in the area where it will conduct its first mining operations.47 The initial mining 
site is by the Adidi mine, close to Mongbwalu town. AGK is currently conducting environmental 
and social impact assessments in anticipation of exploitation starting in mid-2011.
The resumption of industrial mining has symbolic importance, as it indicates that Ituri is stable 
enough for foreign investment, but there are downsides. AGK will have to displace thousands 
of artisanal miners who are currently working in the area near Mongbwalu, potentially creating 
massive unemployment and social upheaval. AGK will also control the gold it produces, cutting 
out local businessmen, who will be competing for the reduced artisanal production.
The displacement of artisanal miners from areas of high productivity may lead to conflict. The 
first step in AGK’s enclosure of the target area was the December 2007 closure of the productive 
Adidi underground mine, which had been the main source of gold traded in Mongbwalu town. 
Leaders of miners’ organisations and members of a civil society coalition called La Cadre de 
Concertation (CdC) convinced angry miners to forgo a march on AGK headquarters, thus 
avoiding a potentially violent demonstration.48 There are concerns in the Kilo belt that there may 
be violent resistance when AGK starts to displace other miners in 2011. This could disrupt all 
forms of mining in the area and have a negative impact on both formal and informal gold trading.
The risks of conflict are demonstrated by a May 2010 incident in the Kibali concession near 
Watsa in the Haut-Uélé district. The Kibali Gold Project is a joint venture between Canadian 
company Randgold, South African Anglogold Ashanti, and OKIMO.49 In May 2010, the Kibali 
project sent letters to 22 sub-contractors near Watsa, telling them to vacate their mining sites 
by the end of June 201050. The sub-contractors were upset and requested a meeting with Kibali 
project officers. According to an OKIMO source, the sub-contractors spread a rumour among the 
local population to the effect that the Kibali project planned to move several villages in addition 
to clearing the area of miners, which inflamed the local population. 
During a meeting in May between the sub-contractors and Kibali project officers, the police 
(PNC) fired on a crowd of people who were concerned about the displacement, killing one person 
and wounding three.51 In June, the Kibali project brought in OKIMO representatives from Bunia 
to help broker an agreement and calm the situation. As a result, the Kibali project agreed to allow 
the sub-contractors to continue their activities until August; in addition, the Kibali project paid 
the sub-contractors and gave them contracts for other mining sites in the area.
The May 2010 incident near Watsa highlights the dangers of government efforts to formalise gold 
production. Planned industrial operations in areas of extensive artisanal production run the risk 
of inciting conflict if relations with local communities are handled crudely, as was the case with 
the closure of Adidi and the vacancy order near Watsa. This is a particular concern in the Kilo belt 
and with AGK, as many of the miners in this area are former rebels, and many are reported to be 
armed. The concern is that industrial production could reignite conflict, and this in turn would 
perpetuate artisanal production and the informal trade.
Semi-industrial mining has also increased in the last few years. OKIMO has signed contracts with 
several companies engaged in alluvial mining within the Kilo belt.52 Although these companies 
47 this equates to 3,077,889,000 $us based on the 9th January 2010 world price of gold (1153.06$/oz, 37.07$/g) (source: ‘Quarterly report’, 
angloGold ashanti, december 2007: p. 14). 
48 see ‘the new gold rush: post-conflict mining and trading in the Kilo belt, dr Congo’, dan fahey (2011), in: ‘Natural resources and local 
livelihoods in the Great Lakes region in Africa’, an ansoms & stefaan Marysse (eds.) (2011): pp. 170-191.  
49 ‘AngloGold/Randgold up Moto stake’, 2nd november 2009 (source: http://www.miningmx.com/news/gold_and_silver/anglogold-randgold-
up-moto-stake.htm, accessed on 8th august 2010).
50 interview with oKiMo official in bunia, July 2010.
51 ‘Tensions à Watsa: 1 mort et 3 blessés dans un accrochage entre policiers et manifestants’, radio okapi, 24th May 2010. 
52 Kibaligoldmines veut construire sa mine d’or de Doko en juin 2011, mais…’, radio okapi, 23rd July 2010; ‘Kibaligoldmines, projet prometteur 
mais beaucoup de défis’, radio okapi, 19 april 2010; ‘Willy Bafoa ouvre les portes de Okimo aux investisseurs’ (source: ‘actualités’, www.
okimo.org, accessed on 23d december 2010).  
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pay fees to OKIMO for the right to mine, they sell the gold they produce to whomever they 
want; this means that although production is formalised and regulated, the companies are not 
required to sell their gold to official comptoirs. Two of the companies under contract with 
OKIMO (EGIREX and DKCS) reportedly export their gold directly53. For mining areas outside 
of OKIMO’s concession area, the provincial bureau of mines issues licenses.
2.2 continuing problems Despite the congolese government’s
formalisation Drive
Whereas various rebel groups controlled gold production during the war in Ituri, government 
agencies are now reasserting their authority in the district. For example, they monitor compliance 
with official gold mining regulations, and they levy taxes and fees on miners and sub-contractors. 
Unfortunately, the government’s efforts to formalise gold production do not yet extend to 
addressing the social and environmental consequences of mining operations, including the effects 
of mercury use. 
When it comes to attempts to formalise the actual trade in gold, the results of the Congolese 
government’s efforts are even more disappointing. Government agencies have only limited 
involvement in the gold trade. They require négociants to register their businesses, but do little 
to ensure that négociants do not smuggle their gold out of Congo. According to  négociants and 
Congolese government officials, the vast majority of gold exports are unrecorded and no export 
taxes are paid. This suggests that the illegal export of Congolese gold to Uganda, which started 
during the Second Congo War, continues unabated. 
In our opinion, the Congolese authorities would do well to hold négociants accountable for their 
purchases and sales of gold. They could do this, for example, by making periodic, auditable 
reporting a requirement for holding a license to trade in gold.
53 interview with oKiMo official in bunia, July 2010. 
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chapter 3: The gold Trade in Butembo 
By sara geenen
This chapter provides an analysis of the official and unofficial gold business in Butembo, an 
important trading city in the Grand Nord region of North Kivu province. Apart from describing 
Butembo’s rise as a gold trading centre, it sheds light on the latest developments in gold exports 
and offers an explanation for the limited success of the Congolese government’s attempts to 
formalise the gold trade.
3.1 Butembo as a gold Trade centre
The town of Butembo has been an important gold trading centre since the 1980s. In 1982, President 
Mobutu announced the ‘liberalisation of the gold and diamond sector’ in an attempt to generate 
more and much needed state revenues. The population, seeing this as consent for local people to 
exploit the mining concessions, rushed to the gold sites. Traders were also quickly attracted by 
the opportunities and high returns the sector offered. More importantly, gold could be used as 
hard currency, which protected the traders against hyperinflation and depreciation of the national 
currency54. Until the mid-1990s, most gold was flown from Butembo to Bujumbura, which was 
the central regional hub for gold exports, thanks to a free trade regime introduced by Burundi’s 
President Pierre Buyoya, who held office between much of 1987 and 200355. However, after a 
military coup, a civil war and a sanctions regime in Burundi, the centre moved to Kampala, Uganda, 
which is still the regional hub for gold from Ituri, Uélé and the ‘Grand Nord’ in North Kivu. 
The following table shows the quantities of gold that were exported officially from Butembo 
between 2006 and the first half of 2010. The table is mainly based on export figures from the 
Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de Certification (CEEC), and includes the volumes officially 
exported by the export offices and the volumes declared to CEEC by individual traders. 
Table 1: Quantities of gold exported from Butembo (in grams)
Quantities of gold exported 
(grams)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  
(Jan-Jun)
export offices (officially exported) 25204 11559 3056 1376
traders (declared to CeeC) 19829 43592 18849 4134 3931
traders (declared to bureau 
Urbain des Mines et Géologie)
   17163  
Source: CEEC monthly reports (January 2006-June 2010) and Bureau Urbain des Mines et 
Géologie, Butembo, 2009
According to many actors interviewed for this study in North Kivu (Butembo) and Ituri (Bunia), 
the gold trade system in Butembo continues to be dominated by a limited group of powerful 
traders56. About nine names appear on different lists and can be identified as the largest buyers. 
54 ‘Entrepreneurs and parasites : the struggle for indigenous capitalism in Zaïre’, Janet MacGaffey (1987), Cambridge: Cambridge university 
press. 
55 ‘The power of protection. Governance and transborder trade on the Congo-Ugandan frontier’, timothy raeymaekers, Ghent: unpublished phd 
dissertation of the university of Ghent: p. 82.  
56 interviews with various informants in butembo, July-august 2010; official statistics obtained from the Bureau Urbain des Mines et de 
Géologie and CeeC in July-august 2010.
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CEEC data obtained in June 2010 shows that out of 17 registered traders, the four largest handled 
about 70 percent of the gold57. In other monthly data for 2010, 2009 and the second half of 
2008, these proportions are confirmed: the four largest traders (although not always the same 
individuals) have traded 70 to 75 percent of total (official) exports. For the first semester of 2008, 
we can see that out of about 30 registered traders, the four largest traded half of all exports. 
3.2 recent Developments in gold exports
In this section we examine some recent developments in gold exports, and use this data to analyse 
changes in the dynamics and mechanisms of the gold trade, both official and unofficial. 
In recent years, the officially registered comptoirs have not managed to acquire a firm grip on the 
Butembo gold market. This is because a few important traders, who are well established in the 
world of the unofficial gold trade, hold a great deal of power. As Table 1 shows, the volumes of 
gold exported officially through the comptoirs declined dramatically after 2006. 
The gold sector has been subject to several important factors during this period. First, steadily 
rising gold prices and the fact that gold was the only commodity not affected by the international 
economic crisis provided major incentives to trade in gold. Secondly, the Congolese state, with 
support from the international community, started making an attempt to formalise the mining 
sector. Thirdly, gold exploitation and trade was increasingly targeted by international conflict 
minerals campaigners58. 
The bad press for conflict minerals has not discouraged economic operators from engaging in 
the gold sector. It has just pushed trading operations further underground. A December 2008 
report by a UN Panel of Experts reinforced the climate of insecurity and secrecy surrounding the 
gold sector, when it explicitly cited a number of individual traders in and around Butembo, and 
documented the links between certain gold traders and members of armed groups. This report also 
recommended enforcement of sanctions and, with respect to natural resources, due diligence on 
the part of exporters and consumers of Congolese mineral products59. In consequence, economic 
operators in the sector became very reluctant to give any information, frustrated about the gold 
trade’s criminal image and fearing they would be named and shamed by the UN Panel.
 
In 2009, the Ministry of Mines hesitated about granting an exporter’s license to Glory Minerals 
because of the trader’s previous links with Kambale Kisoni, who had been a dominant figure in the 
local gold trade until he was murdered in 200760. In April 2009, CEEC noted the ‘despair’ of Glory 
Minerals over of the delay.61 In the same month, it noted ‘the arrival of a new comptoir, Northern 
Goldline, which is only awaiting funding from the UK’. The following month, CEEC reported it 
had paid the “redevance” (licence fee) and the “caution” (guarantee) for Glory Minerals at the 
bank. In July 2009, Glory Minerals still had not received a permit to buy and sell gold. However, 
the UN Panel of Experts established clear links between Glory Minerals and Northern Goldline, 
which did succeed in starting activities that same month62. Northern Goldline was registered in 
Manchester, UK, in September 200763. Because of financial problems, it only functioned officially 
in Butembo for a few months64, but during this period, it exported about 3000 grams of gold (see 
57 CeeC monthly report, June 2010. 
58 see for instance ‘Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining in eastern Congo’, Global Witness, 31st July 2009; 
‘Digging in: recent developments on conflict minerals’, enough project, 5th January 2010.  
59 s/2008/773: p. 52.
60 interview with local official in butembo, 28th June 2010.
61 CeeC monthly reports april 2009 to July 2009.
62 s/2009/603: p. 40.
63 Credit report northern Goldline (www.ukdata.com/company-credit-reports/northern-GoLdLine-LiMited.html, accessed on 23rd 
december 2010).
64 CeeC monthly report, october 2009.
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Table 2). This gold was purchased and sold by the three traders from Glory Minerals, who were 
still awaiting their official license65. So whereas Glory Minerals as a company has never exported 
any gold ingots, the three traders did buy gold on an individual basis and managed to export this 
through Northern Goldline66. 
Table 2: Quantities of gold officially purchased and exported in 2009
2009 Quantity 
(grams)
 purchased by exported by Destination
January 4333 Glory Minerals  
february 1071 Glory Minerals  
March 214 Glory Minerals  
april  niL   
May  niL   
June  niL   
July 839 northern Goldline northern Goldline northern Goldline Ltd. 18, 
barnett av., Manchester, uK
august     
september 1240 northern Goldline northern Goldline anmar-Metal tr. Congo, shanyah 
16- Zone uae
october     
november     
december 977 northern Goldline northern Goldline hutton Garden n. 5, London 
Central, London, uK
Total 8674   
Source: CEEC, Butembo, 2009 and Bureau Urbain des Mines et Géologie, Butembo, 2009
In May 2010, a new comptoir, Jan Mangal, was registered with the provincial mining 
administration. It has a laboratory in Butembo and exports gold in ingots. According to CEEC, 
it purchased and exported more than 2.5 kg of gold in May and June 2010 (see Table 3). Yet in 
July 2010, it suspended operations. 
Table 3: Quantities of gold officially purchased and exported by Jan mangal
2010 Quantity purchased (grams) Quantity exported (grams)
May 1376  
June 1185 2582
Source: Bureau Urbain des Mines et Géologie, Butembo, 2009
From the preceding account, it is clear that traders are – to a limited extent – willing to “play the 
game” according to the official rules. However, the huge gap between real production and official 
export figures suggests that large-scale operators continue to use systems outside the official 
trade67. Although they may put in requests for official licenses to legitimise some of their activities, 
they still take most of their gold out of the country through unofficial channels. 
Initiatives to formalise the mining sector in eastern DRC will only succeed if complemented by 
new incentives for Congolese gold traders, who need to know that it is to their advantage to 
65 CeeC monthly reports, 2009-2010. 
66 CeeC monthly reports for 2008 and 2009.
67 on the gap between real and official production, see ‘Le fleuve de l’or: the production and trade of gold from Mongbwalu’, dan fahey (2008), 
in: L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2007-2008: pp. 357-384. 
24 international alert
participate in the formalisation process. They need to be convinced that formalisation is the right 
action to take and that the trappings of officialdom – such as transparent taxes, banking services, 
credit facilities and warehouse protection - will be better for business. Until and unless Congolese 
gold traders get this assurance, they will continue operating in unofficial ways, following informal 
rules over which the government has no control. 
Gold traders in Butembo have resisted recent government efforts to formalise and centralise the 
gold trade. For example, they oppose the idea of creating trading centres (‘centres de négoce’) 
trade can be centralised and minerals certified. The 2009 Annual Report of the Bureau Urbain 
says that it tried to raise awareness among traders to persuade them to accept the idea. However, 
it says, traders refused to participate, partly because of power dynamics and conflicts amongst 
themselves, and partly for fear it might make the roads to Butembo dangerous for themselves and 
their clients, and could scare off clients68. 
In our opinion, these arguments are perfectly rational and legitimate in the context of the gold 
sector. First, because of the high value of gold, security is crucial in the trade. Second, trust is 
extremely important in the relationships among gold traders and between gold traders and their 
clients. Reorienting and controlling the trade could well damage these relationships. 
3.3 conclusions: The Trouble with formalisation
Butembo is an important centre for the trade in gold, diamonds, and other minerals. Most of 
the trade takes place “informally” - that is, outside formal government regulation or monitoring 
– just as it did before and during the Congo wars. Two points regarding the gold trade from 
Butembo merit further attention.
First, international and national pressure is pushing the gold trade deeper into the informal 
economy. Pressure from the international community to break the link between minerals and 
armed groups has created a “conflict minerals” discourse that criminalises the economic actors 
involved. Traders fear being named and shamed, or having their international travel restricted 
by sanctions. They prefer to work in secret, particularly when their counterparts in Kampala are 
also increasingly trading in secret69. Indeed, the unofficial trade system in Butembo has been well 
established for decades, and has become an intrinsic part of the local and the regional economy. 
This poses a significant obstacle to current external and internal efforts to formalise the gold 
trade. In addition, the Congolese state does not effectively control its territory and is largely 
absent in many mining sites. The state does not provide security or other basic public services, so 
people have little incentive to “formalise” their activities or join initiatives by the government – in 
partnership with international organisations - to formalise and increase control over the sector. 
Second, recent insecurity in Butembo could impact the minerals trade, pushing it towards other, 
more secure locations. In July 2010, a number of people in Butembo were killed, reportedly by ‘men 
in uniform’ - possibly PNC, FARDC, or demobilised soldiers from Mayi-Mayi militias. In protest, 
the citizens of Butembo closed down all economic activities (“ville morte”) for three days that 
month70. Late in July, on the night before the last of the three strike days, well-known businessman 
Kambale Kasongya was murdered in his house in Butembo71. Kasongya, also known as “Mokolo 
Diamant”, imported second-hand cars and traded in diamonds72. According to some observers, 
68 ‘Rapport annuel’, bureau urbain des Mines et de Géologie (2009) : p. 5. 
69 interviews with informants in Kampala, July-august 2010. 
70 this took place on 9th, 10th and 26th July. ‘Un policier lapidé par la population de Butembo’, tembos yotama, 26 July 2010 (source: www.
benilubero.com, accessed on 23rd december 2010; ‘Butembo: un mort et des biens pillés dans une embuscade d’hommes armés’, radio 
okapi, 4th august 2010; ‘Butembo: vive tension après un quatrième meurtre d’opérateur économique’, radio okapi, 26th July 2010. 
71 ‘Butembo slachthuisstad’, Mo Magazine, 27 July 2010 (source: www.mo.be, accessed on 23rd december 2010). 
72 interview with informants in butembo July 2010.
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a struggle is being played out between an “old” class of powerful traders and a new, emerging 
group73. If recent insecurity is the result of local struggles for power, and not simply criminal activity, 
it is likely that there will be further violence and economic disruption, including interruptions or 
disturbances of mineral trading activities. This development calls for further research. 
73 interviews with various traders in butembo, september 2010.
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chapter 4: cassiterite mining and Trade in the 
Territory of Walikale
By sebastien melmoth
This chapter, based on fieldwork data collected by Jan Cappelle and Sergio Finardi in August 
2010, concerns one of the main cassiterite production areas in North Kivu: Walikale territory, 
and, more specifically, the Binakwa-Obae-Mubi trade route. This highly volatile region produces 
most of North Kivu’s cassiterite, part of which is also sold in South Kivu. 
Though not exhaustive, this chapter aims to analyse the cassiterite trade route from production 
sites to European and Asian importers. We examine the socioeconomic system in the mines, the 
chain of activities from the mines to air shipping sites and the importers of North Kivu minerals. 
4.1 The Diggers: The reign of free enterprise?
Walikale mining sites are isolated forest enclaves with their own governance systems, and 
economies based on barter. The only way to reach them is by plane from Goma to Walikale 
Centre, the territory’s capital, followed by a long trek into the forest by motorbike and on foot. 
The difficult access means that public services are almost non-existent, except in the repressive 
forms of police and military. 
The mining zones are domains of unregulated free enterprise. The relations between the site 
owners and the diggers are not based on a written contract but on an informal, verbal agreement 
between each digger and the mine’s “owner”, completely beyond labour law or any mining 
legislation. Each digger provides his own equipment - a spade, a crowbar, plastic bowls, half cans, 
for example - and the “owner” rents out access to the mine in return for a share of the production. 
This share generally varies between 10 percent and 20 percent, depending on the tax collected by 
customary chiefs from the “owner” renting the land. 
Miners’ earnings are determined by their output. There is no cash payment between the site owner 
and the miner. Most diggers work informally because they do not possess an artisanal miner’s 
card. The card is expensive, its price varies between $30 and $40 depending on the location and 
on the services issuing it. And isolated locations prevent state services from reaching the mining 
sites and making cards available for the miners. Workers exploiting a site (such as the AAA group 
exploiting the Bukombe site in Binakwa) do not have a labour contract and are not registered as 
artisanal miners. Nothing holds the group together except an in-kind compensation agreement 
between the site owner and the miners. 
There is no cash economy in the mines. Barter remains the main mode of transaction on the 
Binakwa-Obae route, where cassiterite replaces cash and serves as a reference for price fixing. 
Everything is measured in cassiterite units of measurement (kg, can or spoon), including game 
sold by hunters and goods sold by ambulant vendors, including manioc flour, palm oil and fish. 
Ambulant vendors sell on credit to villagers and come back on a fixed date to fetch the cassiterite. 
In Binakwa, school fees and health care are also paid for in minerals.
The security situation in Binakwa is a matter for concern. Since May 2010, armed groups have 
raided the area on several occasions:
• May 2010: FDLR fighters attacked and sacked Binakwa. They obtained fresh supplies, taking 
food and various goods (but no minerals), and abducted 20 villagers who were released a 
month later. 
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• In August 2010, Kabalo, a village 17 km from Binakwa (on the Maniema segment) was 
attacked by FDLR fighters. As a safety precaution, after this attack, people spent the night in 
the forest.
• Also in August 2010, Kanzole, a village 13 km from Binakwa on the way to South Kivu, was 
attacked and ransacked by FDLR fighters.
The insecurity in this area has been a growing problem since the beginning of 2010. The objective of 
the Congolese government’s military campaigns in 2009 was to push back the armed groups – and 
notably the FDLR - from mining sites in the hope of weakening them both financially and militarily. 
The operations did push back the FDLR but did not weaken them significantly. They retreated 
deeper into the forest and relinquished control over some mining sites but adjusted their strategy to 
raid74 mining areas. 
The second significant result of the military operations was to effect a change in the FARDC military 
command at the mining site of Bisie in Walikale territory. The Mayi-Mayi-dominated 85th Brigade, 
run by Colonel Sammy, was replaced in 2009 by the 1st Brigade, dominated by the Congrès National 
pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP). This replacement did not lead to a peaceful transition as Mayi-
Mayi Cheka75 joined forces with the FDLR and attacked Mubi several times in 2010, kidnapping 
several foreign pilots in the summer of 2010. It appears that the Mayi-Mayi Cheka were reinforced 
by deserters from the 85th Brigade who did not want to relinquish the site of Bisie. 
Since the beginning of 2010, this area has been hotly disputed by FDLR-Mayi-Mayi Cheka and the 
ex-CNDP FARDC brigade. Frequent raids have disrupted cassiterite trade and forced traders to flee. 
Since the president announced a ban on artisanal exploitation in September 2010, the FARDC has 
started a new military operation in Walikale territory. 
Artisanal miners not only have to deal with physical insecurity – caused by the presence of armed 
groups – but with legal insecurity too, in that they never know whether they will be able to hold 
on to the land where they work. The insecurity of land tenure can lead to physical violence as 
the mine police regularly hunt down illegal diggers (to extort minerals as “taxes”) and as there 
are multiple conflicts over mine ownership. For example, in Binakwa, which has 10 mining sites, 
there are five such conflicts, which for the most part are disputes between local chiefs’ family 
members.
Although everyone is theoretically free to become a digger, the enclave’s economic system is, in 
fact, very controlled. First, the geographical isolation creates a powerful socioeconomic constraint. 
Indeed, besides the lack of social services, all supply of basic necessities comes from outside. 
The local economy is therefore wholly dependent on the outside world: supply depends on the 
overall security situation (after the FDLR raided Binakwa, traders left the town) and prices are 
imposed by the traders. This is a typically supply-driven economy. As far as working conditions 
are concerned, the lack of roads means that the minerals are transported from the sites by porters 
carrying 50-kg bags for many kilometres. Though physically exhausting and unhealthy, it is one 
of the few lucrative jobs available for young men in the region. 
Moreover, the military interferes in this trade by taking a cut of 8 to 15 kg per mining pit and not 
paying certain taxes. The military is therefore able to sell minerals at a lower price than others, a 
competitive advantage which accounts for the persistence of a military commercial chain. Ongoing 
military involvement in the trade is also explained by the fact that military personnel can use force 
to confiscate diggers’ production and can make a fairly good living without working, by forcing 
people to dig for them at gunpoint.
74 interview with iCG in nairobi, september 2010.
75 the Mayi-Mayi Cheka, a group of rural bandits operating in the Walikale territory, are part of the numerous Mayi-Mayi militia groups in 
north Kivu. they have no known specific claims or ethnic affiliation and presently are mostly made of fighters who left the 85th brigade 
run by Colonel sammy in the bisie area. 
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4.2 Understanding the value chain: an attempt to Untangle the profits
North Kivu is a major producer of coltan and cassiterite because deposits are near the surface 
or coming through the soil. In Walikale, on the Binakwa-Obae segment/route, alluvial cassiterite 
deposits are black (they are known locally as “ma-noirée”) whereas on the Bisie segment, deposits 
are red (and known locally as “ma-rougée”).
The exploitation and trade in minerals form a pyramid structure, topped locally by the comptoirs 
in Goma. They provide the traders on the ground with the necessary funds to buy minerals in the 
province’s countless, hard-to-access quarries. This dual flow system – of cash flowing to miners 
who pass minerals up the chain - forms a value chain. Analysing this value chain enables us to 
estimate local profits and the real amount of taxation on this commercial activity. This tax system 
is at the heart of controversy between the private sector and the administration. 
The following table indicates the monthly production of “ma-noirée” and tracks the mineral’s 
rising value as it travels from the mines to the buying offices of Goma.
month cassiterite in kg Binakwa
$5/kg
obae
$5.50/kg
mubi
$6.80/kg
goma
$10/kg
november 2009 6000 kg $30 000 $33 000 $40 800 $60 000
december 2009 6500 kg $32 500 $35 750 $44 200 $65 000
January 2010 6000 kg $30 000 $33 000 $40 800 $60 000
february 2010 5800 kg $29 000 $31 900 $39 400 $58 000
March 2010 5800 kg $29 000 $31 900 $39 400 $58 000
april 2010 7600 kg $38 000 $41 800 $51 680 $76 000
May 2010 6000 kg $30 000 $33 000 $40 800 $60 000
June 2010 7000 kg $35 000 $38 500 $47 600 $70 000 
Total 50700 kg $253 500 $278850 $344 680 $507 000 
Source : Fieldwork report written by a Congolese partner in August 201076 
The cassiterite’s purchase price doubles between the production site and the buying office in 
Goma. The exploitation and trade of minerals are subject to a whole array of taxes with varying 
degrees of legality. The producers and traders are subject to two types of taxation: in-kind taxes 
(mainly for miners) and monetary taxes (mainly for traders).
Since Mubi is the town from where cassiterite is air-lifted to Goma, it is also the place where most 
of the taxes are levied 77 (see table on the next page).:
76 for security reasons, this Congolese partner prefers to remain anonymous.
77 the quantity of minerals chosen as reference value to analyse the weight of taxation is 1800 kg because this is the usual maximum load 
for the small airplanes landing in Mubi .
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Taxes in mubi Taxes ($)
Civil aviation 21.50
General tax office 50
ead tax (province) 270
ead tax Wanyanga sector 170
saessCaM tax 90
saessCaM inspector 20
aneMnKi tax 10
anr 20
Mine police 10
dGr 20
authorisation to transfer minerals 10
Mining administration 20
visa for Mubalaka barrier 25
Total 756.50
Source: fieldwork report written by a Congolese partner in August 201078
When we did our fieldwork in August 2010, taxes levied in Mubi represented 6.1 percent of the 
value of an 1800 kg cargo of cassiterite worth $12,240. The total taxation on the Binakwa-Mubi 
segment represented 11 percent of the value of an 1800 kg cargo of cassiterite.
The analysis of the taxation system in place on the Binakwa-Mubi route shows that:
• The weight of taxes remains reasonable. The 11 percent taxation on the Binakwa-Mubi 
segment is a long way off the heavy tax burden that comptoirs usually denounce (30 to 40 
percent, according to them).
• Transport costs are limited : $1,250 for handling in Mubi and transport to Goma and $1,440 
for the journey from Binakwa to Mubi.
• The profit made by economic actors is handsome but not excessive: around $300 for each 
1800 kg cargo that reaches Goma.
However, it is clear that:
• Most of those taxes are variable, and repetitive. That is, the same service taxes mineral cargos 
several times and in various places. And they are often illegal for several reasons: the service 
is not mandated to collect tax on minerals, the taxation personnel are sometimes not legally 
from the civil service, and the tax amount does not always have a legal basis). More than its 
actual value, it is the multiplication and duplication of taxes that translate into permanent 
negotiations with each service.
• Mubi state and local services live solely from levying cassiterite cargo taxes.
• The multiplication of taxation points translates into an excess (and not a deficit as some believe) 
of administrative and statistical data about the mining trade. Indeed, each new taxation gives 
rise to the emergence of new data and statistics: there is no lack of administrative trail for the 
production and trading of minerals. Numerous public and para-public services (such as the 
mine police, SAESSCAM and Sakima79) register and gather data on minerals movement from 
78  for security reasons, this Congolese partner prefers to remain anonymous.
79  sakima or Société Aurifère du Kivu-Maniema is a public-private partnership between the Canadian company banro and the Congolese 
state. sakima took over sominki’s business after its bankruptcy and legal dissolution in 1997 (source: ‘The coltan phenomenon: how a rare 
mineral has changed the life of the population of war-torn North Kivu province in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, pole institute 
(2002). 
Belgium 48%
hong Kong 9%
rwanda 9%
malaysia 9%
india 7%
russia 6%
Thailand 6%
austria 1% switzerland 0.2%
canada 5%
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the extraction sites to Mubi airport. The problem lies in the unreliability of this multi-layered 
statistical trail, due primarily to the corruption endemic in the various registering services.
• Those who profit from this trade are, in decreasing order of value: 1) the economic actors, 2) 
the civil servants and 3) the producers (local chiefs and diggers).
• It is unclear how much money stays in the pockets of civil servants, and how much reaches 
the various administrations’ budgets.
4.3 a global Business
According to the provincial mining division, there were 23 operating trading posts and two 
exploitation companies (Mwangachuchu Hizi International and Somikivu) in North Kivu in 
August 2010. These buying offices are either Congolese firms (effectively created and headed 
by Congolese businessmen) or foreign firms (created and funded by foreign businessmen). For 
example, in Goma, there are three Chinese buying offices (TTT Mining, Huaying and Donson 
International), a South African buying office (MPC), a Russian buying office (Panafrican Business 
Group), and an Indian one (Afromet).. 
In 2009, the Chinese buying office Huaying was the second cassiterite exporter after AMUR 
and, apart from MHI, the three Chinese buying offices exported most of the coltan.80 As for 
the destination countries, the following graphs based upon data from the provincial mining 
administration show clearly that most importers are based in Europe and the Far East. However, 
there are marked differences: most of the coltan is destined for China while the wolframite is 
bought by European firms and the cassiterite mainly by Belgium (48 percent of exports). The case 
of pyrochlore is special, as it is a monopoly, with only one production site (Lueshe) and just one 
firm exploiting and exporting it (Somikivu) to a single destination: Russia.
Mineral trade in North Kivu is thus completely globalised, at a local level in Goma (where there 
are Congolese, Rwandan, European and Asian economic operators) as well as in its outlets. 
80 2009 exports statistics obtained from the Direction Provinciale des Mines et Géologie of north Kivu in Goma, august 2010. 
Source : Direction Provinciale des Mines et Géologie, North Kivu 
countries importing north Kivu minerals
graph: countries importing cassiterite in 2009 (percent by volume)
Belgium 1.9%
Belgium 42%
vietnam 6%
austria 52%
hong Kong 56%
china 42%
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4.4 conclusions
This study of the Binakwa-Obae-Mubi trade route was carried out in August 2010, at a time 
when several parties were struggling to gain control over the Bisie area. The fighting took a new 
twist in September 2010, when Congo’s President Joseph Kabila suspended mining in the Kivus 
and Maniema provinces and additional troops were sent to Walikale. 
More damaging for the Congolese army, the international press and the United Nations reported 
that mass rapes committed in July 2010, which triggered international outcry, were connected 
to mining activities. First, according to UN sources, the FARDC soldiers tasked with civilian 
protection instead vacated their positions to participate in “lucrative military operations in Omate 
and Bisie mining area” in Walikale in July81. The absence of soldiers left civilians more vulnerable 
to the attacks, which were carried out by several rebel groups. Second, the rebels concerned were 
from Mayi-Mayi Cheka, a militia that had been fighting for control of the Bisie area for several 
months. In early October, Lieutenant-Colonel Mayele, one of the Mayi-Mayi Cheka leaders, was 
handed over to the UN and the Congolese army and indicted for the mass rapes. 
This incident demonstrates the strong connection between unregulated artisanal mining and 
insecurity in the territory of Walikale. Armed groups and the army compete for control over 
mining sites and this fighting will carry on - the population of the area suffering as a result - as 
long as none of them is able to impose its control. Mining in this forest is a violent business which 
benefits both local and international actors. 
81 ‘Congo’s army left posts to mine gold and tin –UN’, reuters, 8 october 2010; s/2010/596: p. 53. 
graph: countries importing coltan in 2009 graph: countries importing wolframite in 2009 
Source: Direction Provinciale des Mines et Géologie, 
North Kivu.
Source: Direction Provinciale des Mines et Géologie, 
North Kivu.
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chapter 5: The Bukavu-Uvira-Bujumbura gold Triangle
By ruben de Koning
5.1 introduction 
This chapter on gold trade in South Kivu does not focus on one specific production area or trade 
axis, but rather on business actors in the commodity chain that operate in or through the frontier 
towns of Bukavu, Uvira and Bujumbura. The chapter also describes the governance conditions in 
some of the main mining areas where gold transacted in the triangle is sourced. There are several 
reasons to focus on gold trade in and out of South Kivu. It is the most valued export commodity 
of the province, but it can escape formal government control, since it is easy to conceal and 
smuggle. Gold is the conflict commodity par excellence, enriching military and political players 
and financing illicit weapons purchases. 
Because of the hidden nature of the gold trade, much of the evidence presented in the chapter is 
anecdotal. Evidence is bound to miss out some key players, and does not provide us with any 
estimates of the quantities of gold produced in certain mine locations or transacted on the different 
trading routes. However, information obtained from multiple sources in local administrations 
and in the private sector demonstrates some important patterns of trade, types of military and 
political involvement, and developments in both. 
The chapter is organised in five parts. The first part provides production estimates and export 
statistics to demonstrate how trade operates underground. The second part examines the few 
licensed exporters in South Kivu and Burundi whose formal transactions are alleged to represent 
only part of their real operations. The third part presents anecdotal evidence about actual business 
transactions along different trading routes. This evidence is alternated with case descriptions 
of mine locations where transacted gold is derived or likely to have derived. The fourth part 
discusses the government’s plan to create centres de négoce for gold in the province. The fifth and 
final part of the chapter draws conclusions and provides tentative recommendations. 
5.2 production and exports 
According to a 2007 report by the Pole Institute, local sources in the industry estimate the gold 
production of South Kivu at around 200 kg a month, an annual total of 4,800 kg.82 There is no 
indication that the level of production has fallen in recent years. On the contrary, production is 
likely to have increased as a result of the rapid rise in gold prices on world markets following 
economic slowdown at the end of 2008. The estimated annual quantity of (unrefined) gold 
produced in South Kivu is worth $160 million on the world market.83
Only a small and ever-decreasing portion of estimated gold production is exported through formal 
channels. According to official data, almost 2,950 kg was exported in 2001, down to 600 kg in 
200584 and just 40 kg in 2009.85 In 2010, the Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small 
Scale Artisanal Mining (SAESSCAM) started to collect some data on the basis of its presence at 
82 ‘Rules for sale: formal and informal cross-border trade in eastern DRC’, aloys tegera & dominic Johnson (2007), Goma: pole institute 
publication. 
83 this estimate is based on the export value of one kg of unrefined gold of $ 33,500 that the Office Congolais de Contrôle (oCC) used in June 
2010 to calculate taxes over recorded gold exports.
84 information from the Office des Douanes et Accises (ofida) in bukavu, cited in ‘Rules for sale : formal and informal cross-border trade in 
eastern DRC’, aloys tegera and dominic Johnson (2007) : p. 40. 
85 information obtained from the Office Congolais de Contrôle (oCC) in bukavu, July 2010. 
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mines and markets in three areas in Mwenga territory86, but quantities registered in the field do 
not even reach the official export level: 13 kg against 32 kg officially exported in the first half of 
2010.87 The limited presence of mining authorities in gold mines and at gold markets means that 
statistics capture just a small fraction of real production.
The decline of official exports from South Kivu between 2001 and 2006 coincided with a rapid 
increase in official exports from nearby Burundi. It has long been known that Burundi was the 
main transit country for gold mined in South Kivu. In 2007, the UN Group of Experts estimated 
that Burundi’s exports consisted of about 2,000 kg of fraudulently imported Congolese gold 
and 500 to 1,000 kg of gold from Burundi itself.88 But official exports from Burundi have also 
declined rapidly during the past three years. Exports for 2010 are likely to drop below even the 
estimated domestic production capacity. Just 142 kg was declared for export during the first six 
months, according to statistics from the Burundi Ministry of Mines.89 
The extra-legal nature of exports from DRC means that it is only possible to speculate on what 
is happening. It may be that Burundi-based traders declare exports less often, but it could also 
be that traders in the region prefer other countries of transit besides Burundi, such as Tanzania, 
or that they directly export to destinations in Europe and Asia without officially re-exporting 
gold through any other country in the region. Official export statistics from Tanzania, Rwanda 
and Uganda do not show any dramatic increase in the 2005-2008 period to suggest increased re-
exportation of Congolese gold.90 
Table 1: production and exports from south Kivu and Burundi in kg, 2001-201091
year estimated 
production
south Kivu 
official exports
south Kivu
registered 
production
south Kivu 
official exports
burundi
2001 - 2,950 - 415 
2002 - 1,952 - 438
2003 - 754 - 2,855
2004 - 605 - 3,229
2005 - 600 - 3,905
2006 - 189 - 4,313
2007 - 106 - 2,422
2008 4,800 65 - 2,107
2009 - 40 - 971
2010
(Jan-Jun)
- 32 13 142
86 Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (saessCaM), Tableau Récapitulatif de Suivi de la Production Journalière, Mois 
Janvier-Juin 2010. unpublished government document, obtained during fieldwork in bukavu, July 2010. 
87 information obtained from the Office Congolais de Contrôle (OCC) in bukavu, July 2010 
88 s/2007/423: p.22
89 ‘Situation du commerce des minerais et des produits de carrières au 30 juin 2010’, unpublished document of the burundian Ministrty of Mines, 
obtained during fieldwork in bujumbura, august 2010. 
90 ‘Minerals Yearbook 2008: Rwanda’, u.s. Geological survey, July 2010; ‘Minerals Yearbook 2008: Uganda’, u.s. Geological survey, december 
2009; ‘Minerals Yearbook 2008: Tanzania’, u.s. Geological survey, april 2010.
91 this table is based on the following sources: ‘Rules for sale: formal and informal cross-border trade in eastern DRC’, aloys tegera & dominic 
Johnson (2007), Goma: pole institute publication; data from the bukavu branch of the Office Congolais de Controle (oCC), data from the 
bukavu branch of the service d’assistance et d’encadrement du small-scale Mining (saessCaM); data from the bukavu branch of the 
Direction des Mines. 
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5.3 licensed operators 
Just a handful of traders officially export from the triangle.92 They purchase from a number of 
licensed négociants, but presumably also from licensed intermediary traders (commissionaires) 
and from artisanal miners (creuseurs), since many of their suppliers cannot be found on the list 
of négociants  issued licences by the Provincial Ministry of Mines in 2010.93 Quantities range 
between 100 and 500 grams per transaction94. Purchasing records are vague about gold origins. 
They often detail little more than the largest town in the vicinity from where gold is transported. 
Companies frequent many of the towns that recur on purchasing records - such as Kama, Namoya, 
Lugushwa, Kampene, Lulingu and Shabunda - from where the gold is presumably flown out by 
air. Other towns named on purchasing documents are Uvira and Mwenga, from where gold is 
presumably taken out by road. 
Between 2003 and 2007, two comptoirs dominated the gold export market in Bujumbura: 
Machacha Ltd. and Farrell Trade and Investment Corporation. These companies ceased operations 
in 2008. This did not lead to an immediate decline of exports in 2008 because Gold Link Burundi 
Trading (GLBT) was able to take advantage of their departure and raise its exports from 543 
kg in 2007 to 1,970 kg in 200895. While solely dominating the market, GLBT, which became 
Berkenrode BVBA in 2009, saw its exports drop to 970 kg in 200996. The downward trend seems 
to continue in 2010, with only 75 kg of exports by the company in the first six months. Two new 
exporters arrived on the scene in 2010 but their exports remain limited. S.E.C.M exported 33 kg 
in the first half of 2010 and Alpha CD Technology, exported 32 kg in the same period.97
When we look at the destination of gold exported from Burundi, customs documents for 2009 
show that Berkenrode BVBA exported its gold to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that year. Data 
from the Burundi Ministry of Mines and from Burundi customs for 2010 does not specify the 
destination of Burundian gold exports. According to a November 2009 UN Group of Experts 
report, the agents for Mr. Mutoka Ruganyira, owner of Berkenrode BVBA, declare small packages 
of less than a kilogram of gold at customs in Dubai before selling it at the Dubai Multi Commodity 
Centre (DMCC).98 To obtain a certificate of origin, exporters simply have to sign to say that their 
gold originated in Burundi, with no checks of any kind to verify the statement99. 
5.4 Trafficking networks and military involvement along the
commodity chain 
The irregular nature of the gold trade means we need to examine anecdotal evidence to identify 
some of the key players operating on different trading routes within the triangle. Information 
about actual transactions is alternated with information about likely or demonstrated mines of 
origin, focussing on the role of state and non-state military actors. 
92 in 2009, the government cut the costs of opening a gold comptoir in 10, bringing the yearly licence cost and one-time deposit down from 
$25,000 to $2,500. overall, and also in south Kivu, the number of comptoirs increased, but many have failed to export legally (source: ‘La 
RDC perd 70 millions $US à cause de la fraude du metal jaune’, La prospérité, 15th July 2009). 
93 the list of 38 distinguishes between category a and category b traders. Category a, or resident traders, are supposed to pay $1,500 for 
their carte de négociant. Category b, or ambulant traders, pay $250. (source: ‘Liste des négociants de l’or’, division des Mines in bukavu, 
obtained during fieldwork in bukavu, July 2010). 
94 daily reports of the Division des Mines concerning the namukaya gold comptoir, obtained during fieldwork in bukavu, July 2010. 
95 source: statistics from the burundi Customs authority. 
96 source: statistics from the burundi Ministry of Water, energy and Mines, obtained during fieldwork in bujumbura, July 2010. 
97 ‘Situation du commerce des minerais et des produits carrières au 30 juin 2010’, unpublished document of the burundian Ministry of Mines, 
obtained during fieldwork in bujumbura, august 2010. 
98 s/2009/603: p. 39.
99 interview with damien Mbonicuye (burundi Ministry of Water, energy and Mines), bujumbura, 15th July 2010. 
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5.4.1 mwenga-Uvira-Burundi 
One non-licensed Congolese trader, active in Kamituga and the High Plateaux area (Itombwe 
forest), explained that part of the gold he sells in Bujumbura comes from the area of Lubumba, 
which is an FDLR-controlled mine in the Itombwe forest at about 30 km from the town of 
Miki100. He claimed that, in December 2009, he sold 460 grams of gold directly to the main gold 
comptoir in Bujumbura. The reason for going to Burundi himself was that gold prices in Bukavu 
and Uvira were low at the time. Normally he would sell to two traders in Uvira, who would then 
take the gold to Bujumbura. The trader interviewed further explained that he is partly financed by 
a Bukavu-based trader, whom he pays back in gold or in cash in case he sells elsewhere. He was 
not aware whether this man held a carte de négociant or to whom he sold his gold. 
The trader admitted that part of the gold he transacts with the above-mentioned people he purchases 
from the area of Lubumba, which is an FDLR-controlled mine in the Itombwe forest, about 30 km 
from the town of Miki. Rebels are alleged to tax about 5 grams per week from each site foreman in 
the twenty or so quarries in the area. According to the trader, FDLR soldiers do not disturb traders 
when they bring in food supplies and commercialise the production from which they derive taxes.
While some smaller mines in Mwenga territory, such as Lubamba, are under some degree of 
control by rebel and militia groups, the major gold mines around Kamituga and Lugushwa are 
FARDC-controlled. Lugushwa, in particular, has attracted a range of security services to seek 
a profit from rapidly growing artisanal mining operations that accommodate several thousand 
artisanal miners, who use intermediate traders to supply major Bukavu- and Goma-based traders 
and trading houses such as Namukaya, Mange, Kajangu, Kulimushi, Sulee and Agefreco. 
State mining services are present in Lugushwa, as are the national police, the military intelligence 
service (T2), the 10th Military Region – based in South Kivu - and FARDC units involved in the 
Amani Leo military campaign.101 A number of pits are under the control of high-ranking military 
officers who are usually posted elsewhere. This generally means that the chef de colline, otherwise 
called PDG (Président-Directeur Général or Chief Executive Officer), of one or more pits receives 
money from a military officer to buy gold for him wherever available, and/or employ or supply 
workers in individual pits in return for the larger part of the production. PDGs may also have a 
few soldiers at their disposal to guard these individual pits and  fend off other traders. In addition 
to controlling individuals’ pits, some senior officers have their soldiers on-site to collect taxes of 
$5 per pit. PDGs operating under the cover of any military officer are exempt from paying these 
military taxes, just as they are exempt from all other customary and official taxes102. 
5.4.2 Walungu-Bukavu-Bujumbura 
Evidence of an illegal transaction in July 2010 links Bujumbura-based traders with Bukavu-based 
traders buying from Walungu territory. According to border officials, several kilograms of gold were 
seized from a female trafficker at Ruzizi I border post, near Bukavu.103 The officials had recognised 
the trafficker as one of the agents of a well-established gold trader in Bukavu as she tried to cross the 
border just before it closed for the night. According to her testimony, she was supposed to meet an 
agent of a Bujumbura-based trader in a hotel in the Rwandan border town of Cyangugu that evening 
to make the transaction. She also said that an intermediary trader had purchased the gold from 
artisanal sites In Mukungwe, Nindja and Nzibira, all in Walungu, and sold it to her patron. 
Eventually she was released and able to continue on her way, after paying a small fine. This 
happened after the intervention that night of a high-ranking and recently integrated military 
officer involved in Amani Leo operations.104 
100 interview with a Congolese gold trader in south Kivu, July 2010. 
101 interview with confidential source within MonusCo, 29th July, 2010. 
102 ibidem. 
103 interview with a Congolese intelligence officer in bukavu, 28th July 2010. 
104 interview with a Congolese intelligence officer in bukavu, 28th July 2010. 
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The Mukungwe mine, from which part of the gold involved in the transaction was allegedly 
sourced, is intensely disputed. For several years, two families claimed ownership of the mine. 
According to UK-based advocacy organisation Global Witness, each side used demobilised or 
dissident fighters to enforce its claim, including former elements of Mudundu 40.105 In March 
2008, FARDC soldiers were sent in to restore order. However, tensions did not subside and 
soldiers of various units gained an interest in mining, much of which was allegedly overseen by 
the deputy commander of the 10th Military Region, based in Bukavu.106 
Although the author of the present chapter could not confirm this last claim, a SAESSCAM 
official in Burhale who mapped the ownership of mine shafts in June 2010 was able to identify 
three military officers of the 10th Military Region as shaft owners. The official explained that 
locally positioned soldiers collect part of the production from these shafts for these owners. There 
does not appear to be a generalised military-controlled taxation system. 
5.4.3 miki-Uvira-Bujumbura 
Besides gold, some cassiterite and coltan is also trafficked between DRC and Burundi through the 
town of Uvira. Cassiterite derives from sites such as Miki, Makenda, and Kitopu, in the Itombwe 
forest region (Mwenga/Uvira territory). According to UN experts, the FDLR exercises a degree of 
control over these sites and taxes the trade that is mostly oriented to Lemera market, from where 
traders take the material to Bukavu107. A local source in Uvira interviewed a number of some 
small-scale traders who said they carried cassiterite from these locations to Uvira. In addition 
traders, bring coltan from the sites of Kitindi (Mwenga territory) and Lulimba (Fizi Territory) to 
Uvira.108 An alliance of FDLR and Mayi-Mayi (Kapopo) elements holds a degree of control over 
these coltan production areas109. 
Small-scale traders sell cassiterite and coltan to a number of buying houses and independent 
traders in Uvira. These Uvira-based traders are alleged to carry minerals by car to Burundi, using 
a small border post at Kavinvira, north of the main crossing at Gatumba. 
5.4.4 Uvira-Kigoma 
As indicated earlier, Tanzania is also an important destination for Congolese gold from South 
Kivu. One example of gold trafficking concerns a shipment of gold across Lake Tanganyika 
between Uvira and Kigoma. According to a Congolese intelligence officer, parcels containing 9 
kg of gold were transported between the two towns in March 2010 and delivered to a Tanzanian 
gold trader.110 The disturbing aspect of this transaction is that it allegedly concerns gold previously 
in the possession of FDLR elements and trafficked with the assistance of a high level FARDC 
commander of the 10th Military Region. 
5.5 formalising Trade, securing markets
The government’s inability to capture gold exports and levy taxes at this level is a consequence 
of its inability to control transactions internally. Bukavu- and Uvira-based traders buy in 
secrecy or send agents directly to mines to purchase for them. As a result, the quantity of gold 
licensed and unlicensed traders possess is unknown, making it impossible to follow active 
traders and keep track of the discrepancy between their recorded purchases and exports. 
Despite the government cutting the cost of acquiring an export licence in 10, active traders 
105 ‘Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining in eastern DRC’, Global Witness, July 2009. 
106 ibidem. 
107 s/2009/603: p. 42. 
108 from both areas porters who carry head loads of 30-50 kg evacuate cassiterite. they are paid around $1.30 per kilo (interview with traders 
in uvira, 28th July 2010). 
109 interview with traders in uvira, 28th July 2010. 
110 interview with a conficential Congolese iintelligence officer in bukavu, 28th July 2010.
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prefer to traffic gold out of the country to avoid export duties which amount to 4.75  percent 
of the export value.111 
One way of bringing traffic out into the open and tracing gold as it moves along the supply chain 
would be to make it advantageous for traders to sell at markets where buyer and sellers come 
together to trade gold openly. There are several markets in the province that are authorised by 
local authorities and where gold trade is formalised to a certain extent. This means that traders 
are organised in a committee that keeps records of traders’ documents and registers transactions. 
For example, this is the case in Mugogo market, 25 km from Bukavu, as well as other markets in 
the vicinity such as Kankinda, Tubimbi and Kilungutwe.112 
The quantity of gold traded in these markets is rather small. According to the president of the 
traders’ committee in Mugogo, about 100-150 grams is traded every market day (each market 
operates once or twice a week), involving about 20 transactions.113 Mugogo brings together 
diggers from mines in the vicinity, such as Mukungwe, and agents that buy for négociants in 
Bukavu. Most of the agents present at the market possess a carte de commissionaire and buy for 
licensed négociants. Mining authorities have not made any attempt so far to centralise recording 
of market transactions and add up the quantities purchased by the different licensed négociants. 
Open markets fail to attract intermediate traders, who rotate between Bukavu/Uvira and interior 
mines and deal with larger quantities of several hundreds of grams per rotation. These traders are 
usually pre-financed and have to deliver gold directly to their sponsor. Preferably they send their 
parcels by colis valeur (parcel of value) on planes to Bukavu, which mining authorities are not 
authorised to open for inspection because of the confidentiality of the mail. But even when they 
go by road and have a decent amount of gold to sell independently, they are unlikely to be able to 
sell it in the market, simply because there are no négociants present. Négociants are not willing to 
take the risk of transporting gold to town after having bought it with the knowledge of potential 
robbers and authorities. 
In Mugogo, the author of this chapter spoke with one trader who was carrying 1 kg of gold, 
purchased in several locations in Mwenga territory. He was on his way to Bukavu and stopped 
in Mugogo to see whether a négociant was present who would have the means to buy such a 
large quantity and take him to Bukavu safely to make the deal there. The trader seemed desperate 
to board a private vehicle. Even on the 25 km stretch between Mugogo and Bukavu there was 
apparently still a chance of being apprehended by authorities or robbed by bandits.
Although little gold is transacted in open markets like Mugogo, this anecdote illustrates that once 
markets and access roads are secured, there may be opportunities to attract sellers and buyers of 
larger volumes and thus ensure that a good part of the gold transacted in the province is exported 
legally. In fact, securing markets is one of the aims of a UN-sponsored project to establish two so-
called centres de négoce for gold in the province, one of which is planned in Mugogo.114 Besides 
investment in posting mining police to provide security, the project encompasses the deployment 
of mining authorities to register transactions and levy taxes, as well as the provision of stocking 
facilities.115 
If Mugogo acquires a reputation as a safe environment where gold can be stored in a secure 
manner, it is likely to attract a large number of gold sellers. It remains to be seen, however, 
111 ‘Rules for sale: formal and informal cross-border trade in eastern DRC’, aloys tegera & dominic Johnson (2007): p. 42. 
112 Mwugogo is located at the junction of several roads that lead to bukavu and therefore has historically been important in linking the 
provincial capital to the Kivu hinterland. there has been gold trading in Mugogo for more than 30 years, but the war led to a sharp decline 
in trading activities, which have only very recently picked up again (source: interview with uniCef employee in bukavu, 23rd June 2010). 
113 interviews with traders in Mugogo market, 21st July 2010. 
114 the other centre de négoce was first planned in baraka in fizi territory, but may also be established in numbi in Kalehe territory (source: 
interview with un representative in bukavu, July 2010). 
115 un development programme (undp), Multi-donor trust fund, ‘Centres de négoce est’ project fact sheet.
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whether Bukavu- and Uvira-based gold buyers will also visit the market regularly. There are two 
reasons why the latter are hesitant about going to Mugogo: first, they are scared of being faced 
with enormous taxes, and, secondly, they feel intimidated by the prospect of having to subject 
themselves to a higher level of government control. Gold buyers are afraid that, if they choose to 
purchase their gold directly in Mugogo, it will be easier for local mining authorities to monitor 
their transactions and prevent them from exporting their gold illegally. In order to stimulate 
Bukavu- and Uvira-based gold buyers to conduct their buying operations in Mugogo, Congolese 
authorities should provide them with special incentives . It may be a good idea, for instance, to 
offer temporary tax exemptions or reductions. Measures like these are absolutely essential for 
Mugogo to become a success. In the absence of special stimuli for gold buyers, Mugogo’s gold 
trading volume is likely to remain rather low and insignificant compared to the total amount of 
gold traded in the province of South Kivu.
Another aim of the centres de négoce project is to extend security to mining areas in the vicinity. 
This goal seems hard to reach in Mugogo. The nearest gold mining area where military interference 
is rampant is that of Mukungwe, 30 km from Mugogo and reachable only by foot after a steep 
3 km climb. A UN representative in Goma admitted to us that this security aspect is difficult to 
achieve from Mugogo and that the centre has more of a development objective, as it would allow 
small-scale traders to sell at a decent price and in a secure environment. The second centre de 
négoce for gold in the province, should, however be located in a place where this security aspect 
can be developed116. For this reason, the UN is considering substituting the intended location of 
Baraka - which is in Fizi territory and far away from active gold mines - for Numbi in Kalehe 
territory where there are militarised mines in the vicinity. 
5.6 conclusions
Gold trade in the Uvira-Bukavu-Burundi triangle has gone almost completely underground. Gold 
is smuggled to neighbouring countries and from there to the rest of the world. A few major 
traders transport gold out of the triangle using intermediary agents. Very little is known about 
downstream markets and clients in Asia, Europe and the Middle East, a subject which merits 
further research. 
Gold trade benefits and may even solidify relationships between the units and commanders 
belonging to the 10th Military Region and those involved in the Amani Leo campaign. The 10th 
Military Region may control mining areas, while Amani Leo commanders control the trade 
emanating from these, as in the case of Mukungwe. Alternatively, commanders of both units can 
control mining pits in the same area and share illicit taxes. The amounts of gold purchased or 
produced for military officers are transacted through established (informal) exporters, but there 
may be other exporters and channels. More research is needed to expose any links. 
Government initiatives to formalise the gold trade have not had any significant effect so far. 
Lower license fees have not stimulated the establishment of new comptoirs for gold. Meanwhile, 
established comptoirs are involved in smuggling or decline to renew their licences. It can be 
argued that the tax burden discourages comptoirs from declaring their exports and that lower 
licensing fees does not counterbalance high export taxes. Attracting traders to open markets may 
improve traceability of gold, both up- and downstream from markets. The centres de négoce 
initiative holds considerable potential, but traders are unlikely to transact gold here if they are 
obliged to pay taxes there. 
Rather than aiming mainly to improve the government’s revenue base, centres de négoce need to 
focus on the security needs of traders and diggers. This means providing safe areas for storing and 
116 interview with a un representative in Goma, 3rd January 2011. 
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trading gold, securing routes to and from markets and extending security to mining areas in the 
vicinity of markets. This is the only way to make sure that markets such as the one at Mugogo 
capture a substantial portion of domestic gold trade. It would also allow greater control at the 
export level. 
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chapter 6: The lulingu-nzovu-nzibira cassiterite axis
By ruben de Koning
6.1 introduction
This chapter focuses on mineral trade along the Lulingu-Nzovu-Nzibira axis, where most of 
South Kivu’s cassiterite production takes place. Traders sourcing cassiterite along the axis have 
in the past been accused of supporting armed groups, notably the FDLR, which controlled large 
areas where some key production sites are located. Recent military operations against the FDLR 
have scattered the movement and dislodged its soldiers from some significant mining locations. 
Drawing on local reports, this chapter shows that despite some military successes against the 
FDLR, mines along the axis cannot be labelled “conflict free”. 
The chapter is organised in four parts. The first part provides available production and trade 
statistics, which demonstrate that cassiterite trade from the axis has declined in recent months, 
despite favourable prices on the world market. This trend is in line with trade from South Kivu as 
a whole. The second part analyses the changing patterns of control over mining areas, particularly 
near Lulingu, and describes episodes of violence near mine locations. The third part examines 
dominant trading and transporting companies at the level of domestic trade and at the export 
level, highlighting malpractices of otherwise legal operators. The fourth and final part draws 
conclusions and provides tentative recommendations. 
It should be noted that, like the other chapters in this volume, this chapter was written on the 
basis of information collected during fieldwork in July and August 2010. Consequently, it does 
not discuss the consequences of the embargo imposed by President Kabila in September 2010. 
6.2 production and Transport 
Cassiterite mines on the axis in question are concentrated in three areas, following the southern 
boundary of Kahuzi Biega National Park (KBNP). The area furthest away from Bukavu is 
Lulingu (Shabunda territory) from where mine locations extend to the west into the park. Most 
minerals taken from the area are transported by air. The airstrip is located in Tshonka, about 
10 km from Lulingu. Small quantities of cassiterite from the area are also airlifted from the 
airstrip in Shabunda. A second area is located in the southeastern corner of KBNP, east of the 
villages of Kigulube and Nzovu (Shabunda territory). Today, minerals are transported either by 
road towards Bukavu or towards Lulingu. A third cassiterite-rich area is that of Nzibira and 
Luntukulu (Walungu territory, Ngweshe collectivité) about 80 km from Bukavu. Minerals from 
these locations are transported by road. The road that runs from Bukavu eastwards to Lulingu 
via Kigulube has been rehabilitated as far as Nzibira. Adjacent to Ngweshe is the collectivité of 
Nindja (Kabare territory) where some cassiterite mines are also located, with their trade oriented 
to Nzibira. 
Mineral deposits along the Lulingu-Nzovu-Nzibira axis are primarily cassiterite, with the most 
important mines located in Shabunda territory. In 2009, the Service des Mines in Shabunda 
registered over 766 tonnes of cassiterite leaving the territory, of which 566 tonnes went by air 
and 200 tonnes by road. The registered production of Shabunda represents 16 percent of total 
official exports from Bukavu that year.117 Data collected by SAESSCAM in the first quarter of 
117 according to export statistics from the Office Congolais de Controle (oCC) of 4,741 tonnes in the calendar year 2009. this figure includes 
cassiterite produced in Maniema, which is mainly exported through bukavu. 
cassiterite production in south Kivu per territory Jan–may 2010
Source: Service D’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining, Bukavu
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2010 suggests an increase in production with an average of 80 tonnes leaving the territory per 
month, against a calculated average of 64 tonnes per month in 2009. Figures for April and May 
2010, however, show a dramatic decrease in production: 3.5 and 15 tonnes respectively. Figures 
for April seem erroneous, considering that the Division des Mines registers 34 tonnes of cassiterite 
leaving the territory by plane in the same month. Assuming that the division between road and air 
transport has remained the same, this figure suggests a decrease in production compared to the 
beginning of 2010, as well as compared to the whole of 2009. 
SAESSCAM production figures for Nzibira and Luntukulu are less erratic and show a steady but 
certain decline during the course of 2010: From 7.5 and 5 tonnes respectively in January 2010, 
to 3 and 1 tonnes in May 2010. Minerals from the Nzovu and Nindja areas are not registered, 
because traded quantities only enter the formal trading sphere either in Lulingu or in Nzibira and 
Burhale. In Burhale, the road from Nzibira merges with the one that goes down to Kamituga and 
continues to Bukavu. Cassiterite trade which is registered for the first time in Burhale in Walungu 
(between 3 and 7 tonnes in the first months of 2010) can come from any mine in Mwenga, 
Shabunda or Kabare territories. 
The decline of registered production along the axis, and for South Kivu as a whole, does not 
appear to be related to the cassiterite export price, which largely follows international price 
developments of tin on the London Metal Exchange. After a dramatic fall in international prices 
at the end of 2008, tin prices have progressively recovered since the beginning of 2009, despite 
ongoing worldwide economic recession. The observed decline in production is more likely the 
result of international buyers pulling out of the DRC in 2010 after being criticised for purchasing 
minerals from rebel-held areas. Although one dominant international buyer (Malaysia Smelting 
Company) continued to import from South Kivu during the first half of 2010, it undoubtedly does 
not fully make up for the fall in demand from other international importers. 
price fluctuations and cassiterite exports from Bukavu feb 2009–Jun 2010
Source: Office Congolais de Controle, Bukavu, S. Kivu
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Due to the remoteness and insecurity of many mining areas, it is hard to estimate the number of 
operational quarries and active miners along the axis. Near Lulingu, nine quarries are mapped by 
International Peace Information Service (IPIS) but without indicating the number of workers.118 
The same amount of quarries is listed around Nzibira and Luntukulu with numbers of workers 
varying between 10 and 100.119 A document obtained at the Chief’s office of Ngweshe in Walungu 
town shows 15 mines in the collectivité where customary taxes are levied.120 All but two names 
(Luntukulu and Zolazola) fail to correspond to the IPIS mapping. This is probably because they 
include gold mines and because some quarries have been exhausted since the IPIS mapping, while 
others have been opened. In the area near Nzovu, within the park, there were up to 40 active 
quarries in 2004, with an estimated 3,600 miners.121 Many of these have been abandoned as they 
yielded mainly coltan, which has had a steadily declining price since 2002. For all areas, it must 
be noted that quarries are relatively small compared, for example, to the quarries in Bisie in North 
Kivu, where each accommodates several hundred diggers. 
6.3 mining and conflict Dynamics 
The security situation is precarious in all three mining areas along the axis. Particularly in the 
mines that are located far from the road and towards or inside the park, there is a high degree of 
interference by FDLR elements. FARDC units involved in the Amani Leo operation have taken 
partial control over most major towns along the road - including Kigulube, Burhale, Nindja, 
Shabunda and Lulingu - thereby driving FDLR units into more remote forest areas, often inside 
the park. MONUSCO efforts to repatriate the FDLR are ongoing but progress is slow. 
118 the quarries involved are bionga, tchonka, nyabesi, namery, nkubu, nietubu, nyabembe, Kanzuzu, swiza. 
119 the quarries involved are Muhinga, namwerwe, Mushangi Zolazola, Maziba Katanga, Maziba, Mushangi, Luntukulu, Kilima Kwale, 
bushushu tete Luntukulu. 
120 for example, the mines of namurhale, Luntukulu, Zolazola, Kalongo, Kadji, irambo, and Gisheshe. 
121 ‘News from the Kahuzi Biega National Park’, Gorilla Journal 28, June 2004. 
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The removal of the FDLR does not lead to full demilitarisation of mines, because FARDC units 
(Amani Leo Command and/or 10th Military Region) take over a degree of control over mining 
operations and trading activities. West of Nzibira, roadside attacks and extortion by FDLR rebels 
or other bandits are frequent, making road transport of minerals beyond this point a highly 
risky undertaking. Fighting along the axis between the FARDC Amani Leo units, the FDLR and 
associated Mayi-Mayi groups is sporadic. The population suffers on the one hand from FDLR 
revenge attacks on villages, and, on the other hand, from clashes between FDLR and FARDC 
units holding the aforementioned villages. 
The cassiterite mine of Nyambembe — on the outskirts of KBNP, 30 km from Lulingu —illustrates 
how army officers benefit from mining and the role minerals play in current conflict dynamics 
in the area. According to a local source, the mine is currently under the control of an Amani 
Leo battalion. Local miners and members of the Service des Mines in Shabunda informed us 
that the cassiterite is being transported under the supervision of soldiers to Tshonka airstrip and 
then sold to a comptoir in Bukavu. Such comptoirs are said to prefinance mining activities in 
return for the right to purchase the cassiterite produced. Since only licensed négociants and their 
commissionaires are able to send and receive minerals on airplanes, the comptoirs would have to 
work through an associated trader who is licensed to do this. 
Case study evidence from elsewhere suggests that FARDC beneficiation usually relies on a 
combination of haphazard and more regular forms of coerced taxation (in money or in kind), as 
well as on individual ownership of mine shafts.122 The latter means that soldiers are permanently 
present in mines and have teams of diggers working for them, by force but also in exchange for 
some supplies and protection. 
A violent incident reported near the village of Nduma, not far from Nyambebwe, suggests that 
soldiers control certain shafts, and operate side by side with other so-called managers who supply 
teams of diggers and carry minerals to trading hubs to sell to négociants. According to a local 
source, FDLR elements - the dominant force in the area for most of 2009 - appeared at the mining 
site in March 2010 after receiving information that FARDC soldiers had taken some degree of 
control over mining operations.123 Asking managers for their mining permits (cartes de creuseurs), 
14 Amani Leo soldiers showed their military authorisation for travelling, thinking this would 
exempt them from illicit taxation and protect them from any other harm. Instead, they were all 
killed on the spot. The managers who were able to show their miner’s permits were left unharmed 
but much of their material was confiscated. The attack was reported on Radio Maendeleo, but 
without mentioning the killings.124 The radio station did mention that a number of people had 
been taken hostage from the areas of Nduma and Nyambembe, including many diggers and 
displaced people from Walikale in North Kivu. 
The reason for taking hostages and the destiny of the victims in this attack remains uncertain, but 
in other cases the FDLR have been known to use local populations to transport minerals from the 
mines they attack and pillage (rather than control on a more permanent basis). For instance, Radio 
Okapi reported that in February 2010 FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Cheka elements pillaged a cassiterite 
pit near the village of Nkumwa, inside KBNP. Two unidentified FARDC soldiers were killed during 
the attack, according to Radio Okapi. It seems likely that they also controlled mining operations.125 
According to a local source, the mine had, like that of Nyambembe, come under the control of 
an Amani Leo commander.126 Following the attack, the FDLR took several dozen people hostage 
122 see ‘Demilitarizing mining areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: the case of northern Katanga province’, ruben de Koning (2010), 
stockholm: sipri insights on peace and security. 
123 radio Maendeleo, a local station in shabunda, reported that in mid-february the village came under attack for the first time by fdLr 
elements operating from their base in ndugu, inside Kbnp, east of Luyuyu (source: ‘Shabunda: les Fdlr attaquent les villages de Bamuguba 
nord’, 15th february 2010). 
124 ‘Shabunda : les Fdlr ont enlevé 150 personnes à la fin février’, radio Maendeleo, 12th March 2010. 
125 ‘Kindu : 2 militaires FARDC tués, 50 personnes déportées, bilan d’une attaque des FDLR à Nkumwa’, radio okapi, 10th february 2010.
126 organisation Chart operations Kimia ii south Kivu, unpublished government document obtained during fieldwork in south Kivu, July 2010. . 
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to carry one tonne of cassiterite from the mine (in Punia in Maniema Province) to Shabembe (in 
Shabunda) and towards Lulingu. Radio Mandeleo reported that the FDLR elements involved in 
Nkumwa were the same ones that attacked Nyambembe a month later. 
Researchers have not obtained any details about armed clashes occurring around mining areas 
in the Nvozu area. It is remarkable, though, that both FARDC commanders and FDLR elements 
that are or were based in this area now seem to operate in mining areas more than 100 km away 
in the northern sector of the park. It is possible that with the closure of Nvozu airstrip, mines 
near to Lulingu are more feasible to exploit and therefore worth controlling and fighting over. In 
addition, Nzovu is better known for its coltan, the price of which has not increased like that of 
cassiterite, potentially drawing people to cassiterite-rich parts of the park. 
In summary, recent military operations (Kimia II and Amani Leo) in Shabunda have led to the 
FARDC extending its influence over mineral-rich areas that were previously under partial or 
complete FDLR control. This has sparked violent counterattacks. Rather than seeking to (re)
establish long-term control, FDLR elements pillage the mines in order to generate income. How 
the FDLR inserts itself in mining activities deeper into Kahuzi Biega National Park in areas under 
more stable military control is a question that deserves further attention. 
There have not been any violent confrontations over mines around Nzibira in recent months, but 
there are still some cassiterite (and coltan) mines in areas that are FDLR-controlled. These are 
located near the villages of Lukoma (Groupement Luago) and Chirambo, both in the collectivité 
of Nindja. Local (mining) authorities in Nzibira state that the FARDC battalion based in Nzibira 
stops négociants accessing FDLR-controlled areas. According to a local civil society representative, 
it is, however, difficult to prevent local small-scale traders from these areas trading minerals at the 
markets of Nzibira and Kankinda. They claim that production derives from mines near Nzibira 
such as Zolazola and Muhinga. In addition, traders can easily bypass local mining authorities 
by declaring their minerals only in Burhale, halfway towards Bukavu. SAESSCAM agents say 
that each week about a one tonne of cassiterite arrives at their post in Burhale that has not been 
registered upon transport before. At this level there is no capacity to verify traders’ claims of 
origin of minerals. 
Despite the fact that, in several mining areas, units involved in the Amani Leo campaign have 
replaced units belonging to the 10th Military Region, there have been no reports of hostilities 
between different FARDC units. For example, Amani Leo forces replaced elements of the 14th 
Brigade in Nzibira at the end of 2009. The latter returned to their barracks in Walungu town. 
According to SAESSCAM agents in Burhale, the 14th Brigade now concentrates its economic 
activities in gold mining areas near the town. Because both Amani Leo and 14th Brigade elements 
have economic interests in mining, they do not confront or accuse each other of wrongdoing. 
Instead, a pattern of peaceful cohabitation has emerged, whereby autonomous units belonging to 
the 10th Military Region oversee some key mineral-rich zones very close to areas that have come 
under Amani Leo command. 
6.4 economic operators 
As we have already said, most minerals produced along the axis are taken out of the area by plane. 
According to statistics obtained from the provincial Division des Mines, three air cargo companies 
operate flights to Lulingu and Shabunda: Agefreco, New Congocom Air (NCCA), and Hirondelle.127 
Planes that touch down in these locations also load minerals elsewhere, notably in Maniema (Kasese, 
Kalima, Punia) but also in North Kivu (Lubutu), as well as in other areas in South Kivu (Lugushwa) 
where small quantities of minerals are loaded. Daily reports from Division des Mines agents posted 
127  data obtained from the Division des Mines in bukavu, July 2010. 
source of origin of cassiterite arriving in Bukavu by air Jan 2010
Source: Division des Mines, Bukavu, South Kivu
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
n Walikale
n lubutu
n punia
n Kalima
n Kasese
n Kipaka
n lugushwa
n shabunda
n lulingu
agefreco congocom hirondelle safeair 
kg
45the complexity of resource governance in a context of state fragility: the case of eastern drC
at air cargo companies’ premises for January and April 2010 show that around 35 percent of 
minerals transported to Bukavu by air originate from Lulingu/Shabunda. Much of the remaining 
65 percent comes from Kasese/Kalima in Maniema. Flights stock 1.5-6,000 tonnes of cassiterite per 
rotation. The number of rotations per week is highly variable, depending on the price of cassiterite, 
the availability of aircraft and petrol, and the level of insecurity. 
 Table 1: air cargo companies’ mineral transports in south Kivu, January-July 2010128
month ncca agefreco hirondelle
Jan 38,618 kg 54,402 kg n/a
feb 41,580 kg 67,192 kg n/a
Mar 65,037 kg 78,891 kg n/a
apr 63,950 kg 40,642 kg 18,546 kg
May 40,488 kg 37,107 kg 27,107 kg
June 25,764 kg 15,709 kg n/a
July 34,143 kg 22,943 kg n/a
According to a representative from Agefreco, the air cargo companies operating from Bukavu 
do not actually own any planes but rely on aircraft rented from the aviation companies SWALA 
Aviation, African Air Service and TRACEP Congo Aviation. However, since in September 2007 
the national Ministry of Transport banned the circulation of Antonov aircrafts that do not meet 
safety standards, only SWALA has planes available for mineral transports: two Skyvans and one 
LET-410, according to a 2010 inventory of the state transport authority Transcom in South Kivu. 
The company’s virtual monopoly in the province  drives up the cost of renting planes to $2,500-
3,900 per rotation, depending on the distance and number of landings, according to an Agefreco 
representative. Increasing rental costs are, in turn, reflected in high transport prices and passed on 
to traders. At NCCA, traders currently pay $1 per kilo transported from major mineral-rich areas 
such as Lulingu and Kasese, compared to $1.50-$2 per kilo from minor areas such as Lugushwa 
and Kipaka. 
128 data obtained from the Division des Mines in bukavu, July 2010. 
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Air cargo companies transport minerals for négociants in Bukavu. These usually have their 
agents, or commissionaires, on-site to make mineral purchases and organise transport to the 
airstrip. These agents usually possess a carte de commissionaire issued by the Division des Mines 
in Bukavu. This licence costs $200 per calendar year, contrasted with $500 for the carte de 
négociant. Although commissionaire status is not in the mining code, it provides a minimal level 
of legality for traders to purchase, hold and transport minerals. Minerals are shipped in the name 
of the négociant, or the comptoir that will collect in Bukavu and pay for transport. Lulingu 
statistics, collected by the Division des Mines upon arrival of goods at the premises of air cargo 
companies, show that some 30 négociants are active in the zone, representing two-thirds of all 
licensed négociants  in South Kivu. In addition, the above-mentioned statistics make reference to 
the comptoirs Afromet and Panju as direct buyers from Lulingu. 
One of the most important freight carriers, Agrefreco, is also directly involved in the 
commercialisation of minerals. Agefreco’s owner, Patrice Bashengezi, holds a carte de négociant.129 
In his daily reports for April 2010, the inspector of the division des mines posted at Agefreco 
accuses the owner of the company of obstructing his investigations into the legal compliance 
of traders making use of the company’s services. Furthermore, in January 2010 the inspector 
observed two cases of tax evasion resulting from under-declaration of goods by traders, and 
the stocking of minerals in the depot of Agefreco.130 This information leads us to conclude that 
some businesses can use their capacity as carrier-cum-trader to circumvent taxes and to help non-
authorised traders sell their minerals.
According to South Kivu customs data, five comptoirs officially exported cassiterite from the province 
in 2010 - Panju, WMC, T.T.T, Bakulikira and BERACHA.131 Data shows that Panju, WMC and 
T.T.T. sell predominantly to Malaysia (Malaysia Smelting Company). Bakulikira sells to MSA in 
Rwanda, and BERACHA sells a very small quantity to an unknown US importer. The main road 
transport company that all exporters use is AGETRAF, a subsidiary of the French company Bolloré. 
Other companies are XL-TRACO (also to Dar es Salaam) and Arc en Ciel (to Rwanda). 
Besides official road and water transport, cassiterite from the axis is said to be transported 
illegally by boat between Bukavu (Muhumba) and Kamembe, in Rwanda. According to traffickers 
interviewed, cross-border deliveries take place during the night and require about 30 minutes and 
a few dollars to bribe the Congolese soldiers that patrol the waters of Lake Kivu at the source 
of the river Ruzizi132. Once they reach the Rwandan side, minerals are loaded on to trucks and 
transported to Kigali without any control or interference by Rwandan authorities. When cassiterite 
prices are low in Bukavu, the extra margin on cassiterite sales in Rwanda can be more than $1.50 
per kilo, making smuggling highly profitable. During these periods many négociants refuse to sell 
to official comptoirs and sell instead to the traders who can arrange illegal transport133. 
One of the traffickers in Bukavu showed the carte de commissionaire he acquired in order to 
avoid trouble with the authorities. He claims to smuggle about 10-20 tonnes per month and 
purchases cassiterite and wolframite in Bukavu with money received from comptoirs in Kigali. 
Sums of money ranging between $50,000 and $200,000 are transferred to his account at a 
Rwandan bank in Cyangugu, just across the border from Bukavu134. Traffickers defend this way 
of conducting their business by arguing that major exporters are equally guilty of fraud by grossly 
under-declaring the quantities of minerals they export135. 
129 in 2006, Mr bashengezi was a candidate for the provincial assembly but did not receive enough votes to become a deputy (source: election 
results published by the independent electoral Commission, http://www.cei-rcd.cd/provinciale/resultats/bukavu_exp.pdf). 
130 saessCaM taxes 0.1 percent of the value of transported minerals (frais de rémunération), which is retroceded to other government services 
(source: interview with saessCaM representative in bukavu, 23rd July 2010). 
131 export statistics for the period between January and May 2010, ofida warehouse in bukavu. 
132 interview with mineral traders in bukavu, 26th July 2010. 
133 interview with mineral traders in bukavu, 26th July 2010. 
134 interview with mineral traders in bukavu, 26th July 2010. 
135 interview with mineral traders in bukavu, 26th July 2010. 
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6.5 conclusions 
Many cassiterite mines along the Lulingu-Nzovu-Nzibira axis are subject to armed conflict. The 
open or hidden involvement of FARDC military elements in mining has triggered attacks by 
the FDLR. The FDLR has resorted to a strategy of looting and kidnapping members of local 
communities to transport minerals. An alliance between FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Cheka operates 
in both North and South Kivu, profiting from the remoteness of Kahuzi Biega National Park. The 
presence of Amani Leo units in mineral-rich areas needs to focus on providing real protection to 
mining communities rather than provoking looting attacks. Sufficient payment and disciplinary 
measures are essential but difficult, partly as a result of the accelerated integration of former 
rebels and militia members into Amani Leo units. 
Companies that knowingly buy from and finance mining operations by military actors are 
complicit with fuelling violence at the local level. But there is a loophole in the UN approach to 
such situations through its Sanctions Committee. Security Council Resolution 1857 of December 
2008 calls for sanctions on ‘individuals or entities supporting the illegal armed Groups in the 
eastern part of the DRC through the illicit trade of natural resources’. Amani Leo units are not 
illegal but part of the regular armed forces of the DRC. Therefore, sanctions do not apply where 
their involvement is alleged,. 
There is no evidence that the agents of transport and trading companies operating on the axis 
engage directly with military players on the ground, be they state or non-state. There are, however, 
other illegalities that state authorities need to be more vigilant on, such as tax evasion, illegal 
purchases, and subsequent whitewashing. These illegalities not only deprive the state of official 
revenues but could also allow (unlicensed) traders that do directly collaborate with military actors 
to commercialise their minerals. 
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chapter 7: The complex conflict Dynamics in Kalehe’s 
nyabibwe mine
By Jeroen cuvelier
7.1 introduction
This chapter aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between artisanal mining 
and conflict in the territory of Kalehe, a heavily militarised area in South Kivu. We will focus 
on Nyabibwe, a cassiterite mine that is important not just in terms of production and numbers 
of artisanal miners, but also in terms of international policy attention. The International Tin 
Research Institute (ITRI), an organisation representing the interests of companies working in 
the worldwide tin industry, has decided to use Nyabibwe as a pilot site for a newly developed 
traceability mechanism, which is supposed to help solve the problem of conflict minerals in 
eastern DRC. 
This chapter argues that, although the traceability mechanism may indeed contribute to increased 
transparency in the artisanal mining sector, it is also likely to create the erroneous impression that 
the issue of conflict minerals is a purely technical problem with a purely technical solution. The 
situation in Nyabibwe highlights the complexity of the relationship between artisanal mining and 
conflict in eastern DRC and illustrates that artisanal mining should not be studied in isolation, 
but should always be looked at in relation to the whole set of factors which cause and perpetuate 
the conflict.
The first part of the chapter provides a short historical overview of the conflict in Kalehe. It shows 
that, in order to understand the continuing violence in the region, it is important to pay close 
attention to the intimate relationship between land and identity. This has become increasingly 
complex in the last few decades, as a result of processes of migration and regional instability, and 
the presence of state and non-state armed groups. The second part describes how mining activities 
in Nyabibwe have been affected by the ongoing conflict in Kalehe and shows how the relationship 
between land and identity also plays an important role in the artisanal mining industry. The 
third and final part of the discussion will be dedicated to a description of one trader involved in 
the buying and selling of cassiterite originating from the Nyabibwe mine, which illustrates how 
traders are more and more concerned about the potential damage to their reputations as a result 
of involvement with conflict minerals. While they continue to be largely unaware of what is going 
on in the mining areas, they do seem to be prepared to support transparency initiatives such as 
the one developed by ITRI. 
7.2 land and identity in the Territory of Kalehe
Kalehe, which has an estimated surface of 4082.25 km2, is one of the eight territories of the 
province of South Kivu. It is bordered by the territories of Walikale and Masisi in the north, by 
Lake Kivu in the east, by the territory of Shabunda in the west, and by the territory of Kabare 
in the south. In 2008, it had a population of approximately 1 million inhabitants136. Kalehe is 
somewhat isolated, since the two roads running through the territory – the RN 2 and 3 - are in 
very bad condition137. 
Roughly speaking, there are two longstanding conflicts in Kalehe: one between Havu and Tembo, 
and another one between Havu/Tembo and Banyarwanda communities. The first conflict revolves 
136 ‘Preliminary assessment and technical report for the Kalehe project of Shamika Resources Inc.’, Geodem inc., november 2008: p. 3. 
137 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: pp. 6-8. 
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around the creation of a new territory called Bunyakiri. Whereas members of the Tembo and 
Barongeronge communities are in favour of establishing the new administrative unit, members of 
the Havu community and of the local administration have always rejected this demand138. During 
the rebellion of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), it seemed as if the 
Tembo and Barongeronge would get what they wanted. In September 1999, the RCD decided to 
separate Bunyakiri from Kalehe with the aim of turning it into a new territory. However, in 2008, 
Bunyakiri lost its newly acquired status and became part of the territory of Kalehe again139. 
The second conflict in Kalehe, which pits Banyarwanda against members of the Havu and 
Tembo communities, dates back to the 1950s. The influx of Banyarwanda in the decade before 
independence was due to Belgian colonists’ demand for foreign labour to run tea, coffee and 
cinchona plantations in the territory of Kalehe. Little by little, these Banyarwanda migrants – who 
either came from Rwanda or from Masisi – started making arrangements with local Havu and 
Tembo chiefs to work unoccupied plots of land on the High Plateaux. Initially, they respected the 
authority of the local customary chiefs who had given them their land, but during the 1980s, they 
started asking for more autonomy140. 
During the Second Congo War, between August 1998 and July 2003, the RCD responded to 
the Banyarwanda call for more autonomy by creating a new groupement called Mianzi141. For 
the Banyarwanda, the advantage of creating Mianzi was that they no longer depended on the 
goodwill of Havu and Tembo chiefs to access land. Once they had their own customary chiefs, 
they had no obligation to submit to the authority of other ethnic groups’ traditional chiefs142. 
We should emphasise that the land issue is not the only factor to cause tension between 
Banyarwanda and members of communities that see themselves as “indigenous”. Another issue 
straining the relationship between the two communities is the nationality debate. In the context 
of the Conférence Nationale Souveraine, which took place in the early the 1990s, the government 
decided to organise a census. The Kinshasa government’s decision to only grant Zairian nationality 
to people who could prove that their ancestors had arrived in the country before 1908 meant 
that a large group of Banyarwanda migrants were denied citizenship of the country that would 
become Democratic Republic of Congo143. 
As could be expected, the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath have had a strong impact on the 
relationship between the different population groups in Kalehe. Large groups of Rwandan refugees 
arrived in the area and a big Rwandan refugee camp was built 4 km south of the centre of Kalehe. 
There was a considerable degree of interaction between the newcomers and the Rwandophones 
already present in the area. While, on the one hand, Hutu refugees established contacts with other 
Hutu living on the High Plateaux, on the other hand, some Tutsi were so scared of the presence 
of Interahamwe Hutu génocidaires among the refugees that they fled to Rwanda. All in all, the 
Rwandan genocide and the subsequent influx of Rwandan refugees - amongst whom were armed 
militia or ex-FAR - gave rise to increasing tension between Hutu and Tutsi on the High Plateaux144. 
Since the peace accords of 2003, several armed groups have operated in the territory of Kalehe. The 
most important ones have been the FDLR, the Congolese army (FARDC), PARECO and various 
Mayi-Mayi groups. In 2007, the number of FDLR fighters was estimated at 6,000 to 7,000 for the 
two Kivu provinces. No less than 2,000 of these men were believed to be operating in Kalehe. The 
FDLR is composed of former members of the Rwandan army (ex-FAR), members of extremist Hutu 
138 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 10. 
139 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 14. 
140 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 16. 
141 Mianzi was composed of pieces of land previously belonging to the groupements of Ziralo and buzi. Ziralo and buzi themselves were 
transformed into chieftaincies (chefferies) (‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC/Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 21. 
142 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC/Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 21. 
143 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 18. 
144 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 19. 
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militias (Interahamwe), Congolese and Rwandese civilians and refugees. Until recently, the four 
main FDLR strongholds in Kalehe were Ekingi (groupement de Kalima), Ngokwe (groupement de 
Mubugu), Bugaru (groupement de Kalonge) and Chambombo (groupement de Ziralo)145. 
The presence of the Congolese national army in the territory of Kalehe can be explained by the 
threats posed by rebel leader Laurent Nkunda’s forces (until January 2009146) and by FDLR 
forces. The two most recent confrontations between the FARDC and the FDLR took place in 
December 2009 and August 2010. The first confrontation occurred in Nyamukubi, which is 15 
km from the mining centre of Nyabibwe. After having looted the villages of Kamikonzi, Bukungi, 
Uguli, Etungi and Bushebere, FDLR forces attempted to attack positions of FARDC troops of the 
23rd Sector of the Kimya II operations, but they failed147. The second clash is said to have taken 
place in the High Plateaux of Kalehe, in the area near  Nyawaronga, Katasomwa, Lijiwe and 
Chabangi. Radio Okapi reported that the fighting left two people dead and one wounded148.
PARECO – Patriotes Résistants Congolais - was formed in the territory of Masisi in March 
2007 as an umbrella group uniting various armed groups of Hutu, Tembo, Hunde and Nande 
originating from Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale. In Kalehe, it quickly became the most powerful 
and important armed group. Since, on the High Plateaux, PARECO was made up almost 
exclusively of Hutu combatants, most communities in Kalehe considered it to be a militia aiming 
to defend Hutu interests. For a long time, PARECO’s main objective was to stop the advance of 
Laurent Nkunda’s forces, which it believed to be a threat to the interests of the “indigenous” 
communities of the southern part of the province of North Kivu and the northern part of the 
territory of Kalehe149. 
The most prominent Mayi-Mayi group in Kalehe is that of Kirikicho. It is mainly composed of 
Tembo fighters from the groupements Ziralo and Ufamundu. Kirikicho is a former captain of 
the Mayi-Mayi group led by Padiri150. Dissatisfied with the rank of major he was promised at 
the time of the integration of Congo’s armed forces in 2003, Kirikicho decided to continue his 
armed struggle against the FARDC. In 2007, he was finally prepared to integrate his forces into 
the Congolese national army and was assigned the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the 10th Military 
region. Eventually, however, he resolved to return to the bush, disgruntled at the way things were 
arranged. He had wanted guarantees concerning the protection of Ziralo by FARDC troops; he 
was not pleased with the way his men were paid; and he was disappointed about the army rank 
he had been given151.
7.3 mining and conflict in nyabibwe
Traditionally, Kalehe’s most important economic activities are agriculture, fishing, cattle breeding 
and petty trade. During the past two or three decades, however, the area has also witnessed a 
growth of artisanal mining activities. The artisanal exploitation of minerals such as cassiterite, 
gold and coltan occurs at various places around the region, and the largest concentration of these 
sites is on the High Plateaux152. 
145 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 25. 
146 the national Congress for the defence of the people (Cndp) was formed in order to avenge the war crimes of the fdLr (source: ‘CNDP 
leader Laurent Nkunda seized by Rwandan army’, united nations radio, 23rd January 2009). 
147 ‘Kalehe: des attaques attribuées aux FDLR contre les FARDC signalées à Nyabibwe’, radio okapi, 11th december 2009. 
148 ‘Kalehe: affrontements entre FARDC et FDLR, deux morts et un blessé’, radio okapi, 16th august 2010. 
149 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 28.
150 during the second Congo War, padiri led a Mayi-Mayi group in south Kivu which claimed to fight against the invasion of the drC by soldiers 
of the rCd rebel movement and the rwandan national army. at the time of writing, padiri is a high-ranking general in the fardC (source: 
‘The dynamics of transnational violence in the Great Lakes region: state transformation and social crisis in Kivu (Democratic Republic of Congo), 
denis tull (2004), in: ‘Social spaces of African societies: applications and critique about transnational social spaces’, Jürgen ossenbrügge & 
Mechteld reh (eds.), Münster: Lit verlag: pp. 213-214. 
151 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC / Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 29. 
152 ‘Analyse de contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, apC/Life & peace institute, april 2009: p. 8. 
51the complexity of resource governance in a context of state fragility: the case of eastern drC
Nyabibwe is situated in the Buhavu chieftaincy of the territory of Kalehe, where there are 
substantial deposits of cassiterite153. Between 1980 and 1984, the Société Minière de Goma 
(SMDG) worked there on an industrial scale154. After the departure of SMDG, all its mining 
assets were taken over by Jules Chirimwami, a Havu who held the position of chef de groupement 
of Mpinga and who was also related to the mwami of the Buhavu chieftaincy in Kalehe. When 
Jules Chirimwami died, his brother Placide - who until then had been making a career for himself 
as a trader of coffee and cinchona - stepped forward and presented himself as the new owner of 
Kalimbi. Because he failed to evict the artisanal miners who had started working in the mine, he 
tried to win their sympathy by setting up an organisation called COOMBECKA (Coopérative 
du Bien-être de Kalehe), of which the majority of members were of Havu origin155. In 1993, the 
provincial authorities of South Kivu officially recognised COOMBECKA as a cooperative. At 
the same time, they authorised it to manage the abandoned assets of SMDG for a period of 30 
years156. 
According to a research report published by GTZ-Burundi and OGP-Bukavu  in February 
2010, Placide Chirimwami has succeeded in strengthening his control over the Kalimbi mine by 
concluding strategic alliances with a wide range of political, civil and military authorities in the 
region157. The following case study provides a good illustration of the techniques needed to assert 
and maintain control over major economic assets such as mines.
The court case between coomBecKa and a group of independent artisanal miners158.
on 2nd october 2009, the justice of the court (tribunal de paix) of Kalehe heard a case between the 
mining cooperative CooMbeCKa and a group of independent miners living and working in the mine 
of Kalimbi. CooMbeCKa accused the miners of having violated its rights in several respects. it 
formulated its complaint in the following manner:
‘Having no title or right, and taking advantage of the war of 1996, the defendants have authorized themselves 
to exploit the pits of the plaintiff and to dig for cassiterite ores; (they have authorized themselves) to live in 
the defendant’s four houses and to grow food crops to the detriment of the local community (…).’
CooMbeCKa claimed to possess several documents demonstrating the legitimacy of its claim. it 
gave the court a series of papers to prove its status as a legally recognised mining cooperative, and 
came up with a number of documents meant to demonstrate its ownership of the concession in which 
the Kalimbi mine was situated. the file submitted by CooMbeCKa included a letter signed on 3rd 
June 2009 by the head of the provincial mining division of south Kivu who had provisionally authorised 
the mining cooperative to engage in artisanal mining in Kalimbi, and an application form for the 
Congolese mining register (cadastre minier) dated 1st december 2004 that had been submitted by the 
mining cooperative with a view to acquiring exploitation rights for Kalimbi.
the defendants countered that the plaintiff’s accusations were baseless. they said that, in their 
view, CooMbeCKa did not have the right to present itself as the heir of the properties left behind 
by the french mining company. baudouin Musafiri, one of those who had been taken to court by 
CooMbeCKa, argued that the law allowed him to work as an artisanal miner because he was in the 
possession of a so-called carte de creuseur or a digger permit. furthermore, he told the judge he had 
serious doubts about CooMbeCKa’s ownership of the mine:
153 ‘L’économie des groupes armés au Sud-Kivu, RD Congo’, GtZ burundi / oGp, february 2010: pp. 54-55. 
154 ‘preliminary assessment and technical report for the Kalehe project of shamika resources inc.’, Geodem inc. (2008): p. 12. 
155 interview with placide Chirimwami, 25th august 2010. 
156 ‘L’économie des groupes armés au Sud-Kivu, RD Congo’, GtZ / burundi & oGp, february 2010: pp. 54-55. 
157 ‘L’économie des groupes armés au Sud-Kivu, RD Congo’, GtZ-burundi & oGp-bukavu, february 2010, pp. 54-55. 
158 source: several official documents pertaining to the court case between CooMbeCKa and a group of independent artisanal miners (public 
hearing on 2nd october 2009). 
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‘The defendant Musafiri Baudouin (…) declared before the court that the concession did not belong to him, 
but that he defended the interests of the population that exploited it; moreover, he argued he had the right 
to work in the concession because he had a digger permit (carte de creuseur) and because he was in the 
possession of administrative letters questioning the plaintiff’s status as owner of the mine.’
in the end, the judge ruled in favour of CooMbeCKa, stating that only CooMbeCKa had been able 
to present documents issued by what he considered to be the proper authorities. he found the 
defendants guilty of occupying the concession illegally and sentenced them to payment of us$5,000 
in damages. the  judge referred in his ruling to the land law of July 1973 and an amendment to that 
law in July 1980: 
‘All the lands occupied by local communities are public lands (terres domaniales). (...) the land law confirms 
the sacred principle of the public nature of land, that is to say, (the principle according to which) the soil 
and the subsoil belong to the state. In order to make this principleconcrete, the state has left the task of 
granting rights over the soil and subsoil in the care of specialized services: at the local level to provincial 
ministers and heads of provincial mining divisions, and at the national level to the minister responsible for 
the mines and for the mining registry. The defendants occupy the Kalimbi concession in an illegal manner 
because they do not have any title given to them by the competent authorities (…) .’
There are several reasons why this court case deserves close attention. First of all, it throws 
an interesting light on the complex relationship between artisanal mining and land claims in 
the territory of Kalehe. In many parts of the DRC, artisanal miners find themselves in a weak 
position because they lack strong ownership rights. Since they do not own the land where they 
work, they run the risk of being chased off and losing their production as soon as the legal owner 
shows up to claim his property. In Kalimbi, some miners (mostly of Havu origin) have tried to 
insure themselves against such forced evictions by joining the mining cooperative created by 
Chirimwami. Thanks to their membership of COOMBECKA, they have received protection from 
a local strongman who is able to combine different registers of power: Chirimwami is not only a 
successful businessman owning large stretches of land in the area of concern to this report, but he 
also has kinship ties with the head of the Buhavu-chieftaincy, and he has good connections with 
politicians and administrators in South Kivu thanks to his longstanding involvement in local and 
regional politics. Capitalising on his thorough knowledge of the system, Chirimwami has been 
able to obtain a series of documents to back up his ownership claim.
The second reason why this case deserves close attention is that it illustrates the disadvantages as 
well as the advantages of a system of patronage. While diggers who are prepared to obey the rules 
of COOMBECKA can count on Chirimwami’s support, those who are unwilling to follow the rules 
are likely to find themselves excluded and marginalised. From this court case, it is obvious that 
independent artisanal miners – those who refuse to become members of COOMBECKA – run the 
serious risk of being treated as illegal outsiders and usurpers. The reference by COOMBECKA’s 
lawyers to the war of 1996 is highly significant. It is meant to imply that the defendants belong 
to a group of immigrants who have taken advantage of the offensive launched by Laurent Désiré 
Kabila’s AFDL forces to steal land from the Tembo and Havu population in Kalehe. By portraying 
his adversaries as foreigners who work to “the detriment of the local community”, Chirimwami 
plays the identity card: he wants to create the impression that the defendants belong to the category 
of “invasive immigrants”, while he himself tries to defend the interests of the local population.
The third reason why the court case is worth studying in detail is that it tells us something about the 
coexistence of traditional and modern land tenure systems in Kalehe. According to the land law of 
1973 – also known as the Bakajika law – all land is the property of the state159. This means that any 
159  ‘Land and conflict: the case of Masisi’, Koen vlassenroot in: ‘Conflict and social transformation in Eastern DR Congo’, Koen vlassenroot & 
timothy raeymaekers (eds.) (2004), Ghent: academia press. 
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land, whether it is vacant or occupied, can be appropriated by the authorities to sell it to a private 
buyer160. The law mentions a presidential decree which was supposed to regulate land rights for 
customary land areas, but this decree was never issued, leaving customary allocation of land in a legal 
vacuum and destroying the land access security of customary land ownership mechanisms. People 
can no longer be sure that they will be able to continue working the land granted to them by their 
traditional chief, because it may one day be bought by a large landowner161. The judge in the above-
mentioned court case reminds the defendants of this important implication of the Bakajika law: they 
should be well aware of the fact that even customary land areas may be sold to private buyers. 
As the following case will show, the issue of land management in Kalimbi has become even more 
complex since an international mining company arrived on the scene in 2007.
small-scale mining versus large-scale mining: the dispute between local artisanal 
miners and shamika resources
despite the fact that the security situation in Kalehe has been very unstable over the past few years, the 
Canadian mining company shamika resources has taken the risk of performing exploration activities 
in the area. in 2007, its subsidiary, shamika Congo Kalehe sprL, was granted four exploration permits 
in the Kalehe region, which together covered an area of 169 km2. interestingly, permit 7647 contained 
the quarry of Kalimbi162. 
When artisanal miners in the Kalimbi quarry were informed that shamika Congo Kalehe sprL had 
obtained an exploration permit, they feared they would soon be prevented from entering the mine and 
continuing their digging activities163. according to robert vivian, the president and Ceo of shamika 
resources, placide Chirimwami presented himself as the owner of the land on which the Kalimbi 
quarry was located. he also told the company that he was the head of the cooperative working in 
Kalimbi. since the shamika management was eager to be on good terms with all local stakeholders, 
they did their best to come to an agreement with Chirimwami. they promised to give him a form of 
financial compensation if he could prove that he was really the landowner164.
this was not the end of shamika’s problems, however. in an interview published on radio okapi’s 
website in July 2007, south Kivu’s Minister of Mines Crispin Mutuedu claimed that shamika was 
illegally exploiting cassiterite from the mine at Kalimbi. according to Mutuedu, shamika did not have 
an exploitation permit and therefore did not have the right to undertake any excavation activities. 
rejecting Mutuedu’s accusation as unfounded, robert Muongo, the director-general of shamika 
Congo, argued that his company was only carrying out exploration activities in the area, which was 
perfectly in line with the exploration permit it had received from the Congolese mining authorities165. 
in May 2010, robert Muongo wrote to the head of the provincial mining division of south Kivu to make 
it clear to him that shamika’s exploration permit in Kalehe was completely legal and well-founded. he 
emphasised - contrary to the CooMbeCKa leadership’s claim – that shamika’s permit did not overlap 
with any of the zones earmarked for artisanal mining (the so-called Zones d’Exploitation Artisanale)166. 
160 ‘Emergency in Ituri: political complexity, land and other challenges in restoring food security’, Johan pottier (2003), fao international Workshop 
in tivoli, 23rd-25th september 2003: p. 4. 
161 ‘Where did all the land go? enclosure and social struggle in Kivu’, frank van acker, in: Review of African Political Economy, vol. 32, nr. 103: p. 
84. it may also be taken away from them by traditional chiefs themselves who, in many areas, have used the state law to register customary 
lands in their own name, without informing their communities. 
162 in accordance with regulation 43-101 respecting standards of disclosure for mineral projects, which was approved by the Minister of 
finance of Québec in november 2005, shamika resources asked the consultancy firm Geodem inc. to produce a report on the Kalehe 
project with a summary of the available geoscientific information and a presentation of the results of a field visit to Kalehe carried out in 
May 2008. robert vivian, Ceo of shamika resources, was kind enough to provide the author of this chapter with a copy of this report. it is 
entitled ‘Preliminary assessment and technical report for the Kalehe project of Shamika Resources Inc.’, Geodem inc. (2008). 
163 ‘Rebels cash in on Congo’s riches’, the national, 12th august 2008. 
164 e-mail message from robert vivian to the author of this chapter, 13th december 2010. 
165 ‘bukavu: exploitation illégale des minerais, le ministre provincial dénonce’, radio okapi, 13th July 2007. 
166  Letter from robert Muongo to the head of the provincial mining division of south Kivu, 18th May 2010. 
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From this case study, it is clear that the international mining company had trouble convincing 
the local population that its operations were legal. The mining cooperative COOMBECKA made 
skilful use of the fact that, among artisanal miners, there is a lot of suspicion towards foreign 
entrepreneurs and mining companies claiming to have obtained mining permits in Kinshasa.
According to the information presented on its website, the company Shamika Resources was 
incorporated in Canada in 2006. In January 2007, a Congolese subsidiary was created under the 
name of Shamika Congo Kalehe Sprl. It was put under the directorship of Robert Muongo and given 
an office in Goma. People to whom we spoke in the course of our research told us that the company 
was very well connected with powerful political and economic actors in the DRC167. Focusing its 
attention on the western edge of what geologists describe as the Kibara Metallogenic Belt, Shamika 
has acquired prospecting permits for research in several Congolese provinces, including South Kivu, 
Maniema, Katanga and Orientale. The company is interested in a wide variety of minerals, and is 
exploring deposits of cassiterite, tantalite, wolframite, gold and diamonds168.
The Shamika incident does not appear to have weakened Placide Chirimwami’s control over the 
Kalimbi mine. Apparently, he continues to be surrounded by military actors who help him uphold 
his authority in an unstable sociopolitical environment. A research report of GTZ-Burundi and 
OGP-Bukavu argues that Chirimwami constantly has a group of approximately 20 soldiers at 
his disposal, whose primary task is to protect him. The report states that the soldiers used to be 
affiliated with the CNDP, but are now officially integrated in the FARDC. Another indication 
of Chirimwami’s heavy reliance on people with a military background is the appointment of a 
former member of the CNDP as manager of the site of Kalimbi169. 
Having said this, there are some indications that Chirimwami’s position at the local level is increasingly 
being challenged. The following case will show that a considerable number of artisanal miners have 
grown tired of COOMBECKA’s domination over the mining business in Kalimbi. 
in-fighting between two groups of artisanal miners: coomBecKa versus comiKa 
(Coopérative Minière de Kalimbi)
on 28th July 2010, a saessCaM delegation from bukavu convened a meeting between representatives 
of the CooMbeCKa and CoMiKa cooperatives and representatives of several other interest groups in 
nyabibwe. opinions were divided on the meeting’s goals. While some participants thought they were 
just going to discuss various pieces of legislation, others were convinced that the aim was to reinstate 
CooMbeCKa, in accordance with a circular note from the former provincial Minister of Mines. eventually, 
it turned out that the aim of the meeting was to inform people in nyabibwe that none of the parties 
claiming the right to manage the mine of Kalimbi fulfilled the conditions to do so170.
heavily disappointed about the message communicated during the saessCaM meeting, some 
artisanal miners went to Kalimbi on the following evening with the aim of occupying some of the 
most productive pits in the mine. When they were prevented from entering the mine by diggers from 
the rival cooperative CoMiKa, this gave rise to an explosion of violence. on 30th July 2010, a violent 
confrontation between CooMbeCKa and CoMiKa left one person dead and 17 others wounded. 
following instructions from the administrator of the territory of Kalehe, the police and the army 
intervened to put an end to the violence171. 
on 31st July 2010, the administrator of the territory of Kalehe arrived on the scene. he told the 
population of nyabibwe that CoMiKa would be given the right to manage Kalimbi on a temporary 
basis - in other words, until a neutral committee was ready to take over the mine’s management172. 
167 personal communication with source close to shamika resources, 24th august 2010; personal communication with conflict analyst 
specialised in the Great Lakes region, 18th august 2010. 
168 information obtained from the website of shamika resources (www.shamikaresources.com), accessed on 30th august 2010. 
169 ‘L’économie des groups armés au Sud-Kivu, RD Congo’, GtZ-burundi & oGp-bukavu, february 2010: pp. 54-55. 
170 ‘Rapport d’étude sur l’exploitation et la commercialisation de minerais du carré minier de Kalimbi’, aCp, august 2010: p. 13. 
171 ‘Bukavu: un conflit meurtrier dans un carré à Nyabibwe’, radio okapi, 31st July 2010. 
172 ‘Rapport d’étude sur l’exploitation et la commercialisation de minerais du carré minier de Kalimbi’, aCp, august 2010: p. 13. 
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The clash between COOMBECKA and COMIKA shows that the situation in and around 
Nyabibwe is unstable. Public services such as SAESSCAM, the police and the army appear to have 
a hard time keeping control. Looked at from this perspective, one could question whether they 
are really capable of helping to implement transparency initiatives such as the one put forward 
by ITRI.
7.4 Trading minerals in a conflict Zone 
Faced with criticism from a UN Panel of Experts173 and from several international NGOs working 
on natural resource issues174, members of ITRI – an organisation representing the tin industry in 
general, and tin miners and smelters in particular – have come up with the idea of developing 
their own due diligence mechanism for tin minerals originating from the eastern part of the DRC. 
The mechanism has been created by an ITRI working group175 and has been labelled the ITRI Tin 
Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi). 
Interestingly, ITRI has selected Nyabibwe as a pilot site for its traceability project. From the end 
of June 2010 onwards, employees of the iTSCi initiative have been working together with agents 
of SAESSCAM and the Congolese Mining Division (Division des Mines) to tag mineral bags 
originating from the Kalimbi mine. Each load of minerals is supposed to be accompanied by a set 
of documents detailing every single step in the trading process176. 
One of the companies strongly supporting ITRI’s traceability initiative is Minerals Supply Africa 
(MSA). According to an article published in the specialised newsletter Africa Confidential on 6th 
August 2010, MSA is currently the biggest buyer of minerals from eastern DRC. The newsletter 
reports that MSA ‘buys from more than a third of the comptoirs and scoops up just over a quarter 
of the product by volume177’. 
Nyabibwe is one of the mines MSA has been sourcing minerals from. In one case, dating from 
July 2010 and for which we have seen documents, MSA bought a load of 64 drums of cassiterite, 
of which at least 1,450 kg (or 29 bags of 50 kg) out of a total of 46,496 kg originated from 
Nyabibwe. The minerals were transported to Kigali by truck178. 
David Bensusan, a British businessman and director of MSA, told us that his company was 
registered in Rwanda, and was 100 percent beneficially owned by Cronimet Central Africa AG, 
a stock corporation incorporated under Swiss law with its legal seat and offices in Steinhausen, 
Switzerland179. Bensusan combines his directorship of MSA with a position as member of the 
board of directors of Cronimet Central Africa AG180. Cronimet Central Africa AG is owned by 
Cronimet Mining GmbH, which is part of the Cronimet Group. The latter group of companies was 
founded in 1980, with headquarters in the German city of Karlsruhe, and employs 4670 people. 
On its website, it presents itself as a ‘worldwide specialist for stainless steel scrap, ferroalloys and 
primary metals’181. 
173 s/2008/773 final report of the group of experts on the democratic republic of Congo. 
174 ‘Under-mining peace: the explosive trade in cassiterite in Eastern DRC’, Global Witness, June 2005; ‘Faced with a gun what can you do? War and 
the militarisation of mining in Eastern Congo’, Global Witness, July 2009; ‘Culprits or scapegoats? Revisiting the role of Belgian mineral traders 
in Eastern DRC’, international peace information service, May 2009; ‘Artisanal mining and post-conflict reconstruction in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’, ruben de Koning, october 2009, sipri background paper; ‘Digging in: recent developments on conflict minerals’, the 
enough project, January 2010. 
175 the working group included the thailand smelting & refining Co Ltd and the Malaysia smelting Corporation berhad (MsC). it asked the 
belgian company traxys to serve as an expert adviser (source: ‘drC tin supply Chain initiative, itri press release, 10th July 2009). 
176 itsCi news bulletin, 6th august 2010. 
177 ‘New pressure on the war-minerals link’, africa Confidential, vol. 51, nr. 16. 
178 documents accompanying a specific load of minerals exported by bakulikira nguma, obtained from a confidential source in bukavu. 
179 e-mail message from Mr. bensusan, 24th august 2010. 
180 data obtained from the commercial register of Canton Zug, switzerland. 
181  data obtained from the Cronimet website (www.cronimet.de), accessed on 26th august 2010. 
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Until the start of 2007, Bensusan worked through another company in Kigali called Eurotrade 
International SARL. In those days, Eurotrade had a close relationship with the Ichikowitz group 
of companies182. Ivor Ichikowitz, who presents himself as the head of this group, is a prominent 
South African businessman with interests in the defence, oil and mining industries. 
Both Bensusan and Ichikowitz maintain that their business relationship ended in the course of 
2007. In addition to this, they emphasise that they collaborate fully with ITRI’s traceability 
initiative for the Great Lakes region and that Eurotrade International is no longer trading minerals 
from eastern DRC183. 
Ichikowitz’s decision to abandon the mineral trade in eastern DRC appears to be due to his 
growing concern over reputational damage. In a letter to the author of this report, he wrote: ‘(…) 
since the publication of your report184 with the revelations contained therein, I have, personally, 
forbidden any of our organisations, both directly held, as well as associated, companies to have 
any active involvement in the tin mining environment in the Democratic Republic of Congo. To 
the best of our knowledge, none of our employees have visited the DRC since March, 2007 and, 
in fact, certain of our equipment remains stranded there uncovered’185. 
The careful attitude adopted by businessmen such as Bensusan and Ichikowitz shows that 
international mineral traders are increasingly aware of the damage their reputations could suffer 
as a result of involvement in opaque mineral deals in eastern DRC. It is encouraging that they 
are willing to participate in initiatives aimed at making the Congolese mining business more 
transparent. 
7.5 conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to illustrate the complexity of conflict dynamics in a mine such as 
Nyabibwe. We have argued that research into the relationship between artisanal mining and 
armed conflict should be based on a thorough understanding of the history of the region as well 
as the sociocultural context in which mining activities take place. Policy-makers should be well 
aware of the fact that the issue of conflict minerals cannot be solved in a purely technical manner 
since the exploitation of minerals interacts with multiple other conflict factors - land, identity, 
local power struggles. It is of vital importance that those seeking to “clean up” the mining sector 
in eastern DRC do not consider their reform projects as a series of technical interventions that 
can be carried out in an apolitical manner, but that they take into account its possible impact on 
local power struggles, and vice versa.
182 Letter from ivor ichikowitz to the author of this report, 26th august 2010. 
183 interview with david bensusan, 17th august 2010; interview with ivor ichikowitz, 24th august 2010; Letter from ivor ichikowitz to the author 
of this report, 26th august 2010. 
184 ichikowitz refers to a report that was published on the ipis website on 3rd november 2003: ‘trackstar tricked by the rCd: a new episode 
in the scramble for the sominki concessions’. 
185 Letter from ivor ichikowitz to the author of this report, 26th august 2010. 
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chapter 8: artisanal mining and conflict on idjwi 
island: The case of Kamole
By Jeroen cuvelier
8.1 introduction
This chapter will be dedicated to a description and analysis of the dynamics of artisanal mining 
in Kamole, located in the northern part of Idjwi Island. Idjwi lies in the middle of Lake Kivu, 
equidistant from Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Idjwi’s mining business merits 
close attention for several reasons. Firstly, the artisanal mining industry on Idjwi Island has 
remained largely undocumented until now. There is almost no information on the way mining 
activities are influenced by the region’s political economy. Secondly, Idjwi is unique in that, unlike 
the rest of eastern DRC, it has not been plagued by the presence of armed groups, large-scale 
violence or human rights abuses. Consequently, the power dynamics in and around Idjwi’s mines 
are quite different from those in the rest of the region. Finally, Idwji deserves close attention 
because its local systems of land tenure appear to have a strong impact on the way the mining 
process is organised.
The chapter starts with a short overview of Idjwi’s political and economic history. The aim of 
this overview is to demonstrate the persistence of traditional authorities on the island. The next 
part of the chapter will focus on the organisation of mining-related activities in and around the 
Kamole mine. It will show that both the customary chief or mwami and members of the local 
economic elite have a strong influence in the mine, that the local system of land tenure affects the 
mining process, and thon Idjwi has recently witnessed a confrontation between small-scale and 
large-scale mining. 
8.2 The recent political and economic history of idjwi
Idjwi is one of the eight territories of the province of South Kivu. It has a surface of 310 km2 
and a population of approximately 197,600 inhabitants186. Geographically speaking, the island 
is divided in two by a heavily forested mountain belt across its centre187. There are two so-called 
“collectivity-chieftaincies” (collectivités-chefferies). The first chieftaincy is called Rubenga and 
is situated in the northern part of Idjwi (Idjwi Nord). Rubenga is composed of the groupements 
Bugarula, Bunyakiri and Kihumba. The second chieftaincy, Ntambuka, is situated in the 
southern part of Idjwi (Idjwi Sud), and is composed of the groupements Mpene, Mugote and 
Nyakalongwa188. 
During the two recent Congo wars, Idjwi remained largely unaffected by what was going on 
in the rest of the country. Nevertheless, the island served occasionally as a platform for secret 
troop movements and smuggling by some of the belligerents. In July 2002, there were reports of 
thousands of Rwandan troops being sent to the DRC via Idjwi. Apparently, the troops had been 
transported by boat, first from Rwanda to an unknown location in Idjwi, and then from Idjwi 
to a site near Bukavu189. In December 2004, a report by the British All Parliamentary Group on 
the Great Lakes region stated that Idjwi played a pivotal role in arms trafficking operations. The 
186 idjwi is known to be the largest island in Lake Kivu. While its north-south length is estimated at 40 km, its maximum width is estimated at 
12km (source: ‘promotion of birth spacing on idjwi island, Zaire’, M. Carael & John stanbury (1983), in: Studies in Family Planning, vol. 14, 
nr. 5: p. 135. 
187 ‘King and chief: colonial politics on idjwi island’ (Zaire)’, david newbury & Catharine newbury (1982), in: The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, vol. 15, nr. 2: p. 224. 
188 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 4. 
189 ‘Rwanda plans to replace Congolese currency in Eastern DRC’, irin news, 18th July 2002. 
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report asserted that the island was used to stockpile weapons and ammunition that were then 
shipped to various rebel groups in eastern DRC by boat190. 
In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, Idjwi received thousands of refugees. In some 
places, this has led to the destruction of the island’s forests, where refugees cut wood to make fires 
and build temporary shelters191.
With regard to Idjwi’s role during the Congo wars, it is important to mention that both Gervais 
Rubenga, the mwami of Idjwi-Nord, and Roger Ntambuka, the mwami of Idjwi-Sud, were among 
a small group of customary chiefs who collaborated with the RCD-Goma rebel movement. In 
appreciation of their support, the RCD gave Rubenga and Ntambuka the opportunity to serve as 
senators in the national parliament during the period of political transition192. 
The following sections will show that Rubenga, the mwami of Idjwi-Nord, has been influential in 
the island’s artisanal mining industry. 
8.3 mining and conflict on idjwi
8.3.1 a short history of artisanal mining on idjwi island
Most people on Idjwi Island live from livestock, agriculture and fishing193. The number of people 
involved in artisanal mining is limited, especially in comparison with other places in the province 
of South Kivu. The first mining activities on Idjwi probably date back to the beginning of the 
1970s. An expatriate businessman from the territory of Masisi is said to have exploited a mining 
concession adjacent to the parish of Kamole194. Subsequently, between 1980 and 1982, Mwami 
Rubenga II, the father of the current head of the Rubenga chieftaincy, contracted a Rwandan 
labour force with the aim of starting mining activities in Kamole centre and Buhesi. The Rwandan 
diggers sold their minerals to buyers of Havu origin, who then crossed the border in order to 
resell them to Rwandan buyers195. Finally, in 1998, René Shamba and Kasidika started a project 
of artisanal mining in the Nepo mine, selling to buying houses in Goma196. 
Idjwi’s artisanal mining business slowly gained momentum in the first decade of the new 
millennium. Between 2002 and 2006, the most important buyer of Idjwi’s minerals was 
Etablissement Muyeye, one of the leading buying houses for minerals in Bukavu. The British 
NGO Global Witness reported that, in 2007, Byaboshi Muyeye sold cassiterite and wolframite to 
the British company Afrimex and coltan to the Belgian company Traxys197. 
 
Having obtained a five-year contract for the sale of wolframite (tungsten) to a company in Europe, 
Muyeye had his négociants buy substantial quantities of minerals in the mine of Nepo, where the 
daily pit production amounted to 500 kg198. Idjwi’s mining business was at its height in 2007. 
Many people even sold their houses and cows in order to be able to buy a mine pit in Kamole199. 
190 ‘Arms flows in Eastern DR Congo’, report of the all party parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes region, december 2004: p. 26. 
191 ‘Preliminary assessment and technical report on the Idjwi project for Shamika Resources’, Geodem inc. (2008): p. 12. 
192 ‘Le pouvoir traditionnel au sud-Kivu de 1998-2003: rôle et perspectives’, paul-robain namegabe, in: L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, annuaire 
2004-2005, paris: L’harmattan, pp. 213-215. 
193 ‘Preliminary assessment and technial report on the Idjwi project for Shamika Resources’, Geodem inc. (2008): p. 11. 
194 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 6. 
195 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 6. 
196 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 6. 
197 ‘Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining in eastern Congo’, Global Witness, July 2009: p. 55; p. 97. according 
to two reports of the un panel of experts, which were published in december 2008 and november 2009 respectively, Muyeye sometimes 
bought minerals from fdLr controlled areas. the panel even adduced evidence that he had made money transfers to fdLr representatives 
in Germany at some point.
198 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 6. 
199 interview with aprodeped representative in Kamole, 23rd July 2010. 
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During the last third of 2009, large groups of artisanal miners and mineral buyers left Idjwi and 
moved to the territories of Kalehe and Walikale in order to dig for cassiterite ore200. They had 
three reasons for moving: they felt discouraged by the heavy rains (and the difficult working 
conditions resulting from it); by the declining level of production in mines such as Kamole; and 
by the decline in world market prices of tungsten. Whereas, at the start of 2009, one kilogram of 
wolframite was still traded at US$8 at the level of the mine in Idjwi, by the first third of 2010, the 
price for one kilogram of wolframite had dropped to US$3201. 
8.3.2 Working and living conditions at the bottom of the commodity chain
Artisanal mining is a seasonal activity202, which only takes place in certain parts of the island. As 
opposed to their colleagues in other parts of eastern DRC, Idjwi-based artisanal miners do not live 
in mining camps close to the mine. Instead, they rent houses among the rest of the population203.
Mine pits are usually circular in shape. Diggers tend to digging vertically, sometimes reaching a 
depth of 30-50 metres204. They use bags or buckets to evacuate waste material and minerals. The 
bags and buckets are tied to a rope connected to a horizontally placed beam at the entrance of the 
pit. Since most of the pits are very deep, artisanal mining is extremely dangerous. Diggers run the 
risk of the sudden collapse of their pit or running out of oxygen at any moment. Pits continue to 
claim victims even after they have been abandoned due to declining production. In 2010 alone, 
12 people died after falling into a deserted mine pit205.
Apart from the artisanal miners, two other categories of actors operate in Idjwi’s mining sector, namely 
the négociants (mineral buyers) and the managers or PDGs (pit owners). While négociants serve as 
intermediaries between diggers and buying houses based in Goma and Bukavu, managers have the 
task of “taking care” (encadrer) of the creuseurs: they are expected to supply them with food and 
materials during the excavation works. According to one manager in Butonyi/Chuve (groupement of 
Kihumba, northern part of Idjwi), the revenues from minerals sales are generally divided into three 
parts: the first part for the manager, the second part goes to the diggers and the third part is used to 
cover diggers’ expenses during the preparatory phase (the phase preceding the phase of production). 
One manager working in the mine of Kamole centre informed us that the mwami of the Rubenga 
chieftaincy in the northern part of the island claimed part of the profits as well. He said that 10 
percent of the value of a load of minerals was usually transmitted to the mwami206. 
The following table gives an overview of the different taxes that artisanal miners paid in the 
northern part of the Island of Idjwi during the boom period (2006-2007)207. 
200 for more information about the Kalimbi mine, see the case study on nyabibwe in this report. 
201 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 8. 
202 no mining activities take place during the rainy season (source: interview with police commander in bugarula, 22nd July 2010). 
203 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 7. 
204 the main reason for digging vertically appears to be its speed. diggers want to reach the ore vein as quickly as possible and therefore they 
do not want to go to the trouble of constructing stairs on one side of the pit (source: interview with aprodeped representative in Kamole, 
23rd July 2010). 
205 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 7. 
206 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 7. 
207 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 8. 
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Beneficiary Description official amount amount paid
division des Mines Carte de creuseur (digger 
permit)
us$25 us$30 
saessCaM pit money for ordinary 
creuseurs
----- us$2 per pit / month 
saessCaM pit money for pit owners ----- us$55 
bureau du territoire ----- ----- amount unknown
Mwami Customary tax for ordinary 
creuseurs
----- us$1 per week
Mwami Customary tax 
for pit owners
----- 10% of production
dGM ----- ----- amount unknown
It appears that Idjwi-based artisanal miners now only pay the customary tax to the mwami (10 
percent of the value of their production). They no longer pay taxes to the above-mentioned state 
services208. 
8.3.3 The relationship between artisanal mining and customary land ownership 
systems 
In many parts of eastern DRC, access to land used to depend on an initial payment of tribute 
to the chief, a tax system known as kalinzi in the Havu language. After this initial payment, the 
farmer in question acquired user rights over a piece of customary land, though he continued to 
pay tribute to the chief at frequent intervals. While the farmer did not have complete property 
rights – the land remained customary at all times – he did have the possibility of leasing portions 
of his land to other people who, in their turn, would be obliged to pay him tribute for it. In this 
manner, a complex structure of rights came into existence. Producers paid tribute to the person 
who had given them access to land, and the latter transferred part of this tribute to a higher level 
in the hierarchy209. 
Interestingly, land tenure on Idjwi Island is still largely based on this kalinzi system. As the 
following sections will show, this has a significant impact on the artisanal mining industry. 
Artisanal miners who want to dig a pit have to reach an agreement with whoever has user rights 
over the land where the pit is situated.
large-scale landowners and small-scale miners
one of our informants tried to capitalise on the development of artisanal mining on idjwi island, where 
he was born and raised. Working as a commercial representative of a large national company in Goma, 
he wanted to obtain a concession on idjwi where he and his family could relax during the weekend. he 
went to see Mwami rubenga iii, who he knew was responsible for distributing land in the northern part 
of the island. the mwami told him that he would have to pay him the annual kalinzi tax210. 
after acquiring a concession of 20 hectares in the groupement of Kihumba, our informant wanted to 
build a house for his family and a private beach for his children. it was not until a couple of months later 
that he was contacted by a négociant interested in buying minerals from his concession. the person in 
question had already been buying minerals since 2008, operating in mines such as nyabibwe, numbi 
and Walikale. our informant reached a verbal agreement with him, in exchange for an initial payment 
of us$60 per 5 m2. once production got going, however, the mineral buyer started making payments 
of us$40 per month211.
208 interview with aprodeped representative in Kamole, 22nd July 2010. 
209 ‘Land, migration and conflict in eastern DRC’, Koen vlassenroot & Chris huggins (2005): pp. 124-125, in: ‘From the ground up: land rights, 
conflict and peace in Sub-Sahara Africa’, Chris huggins & Jenny Clover (eds.) (2005), pretoria: institute for security studies. 
210 interview with confidential source in Kihumba, 23rdJuly 2010. 
211 interview with mineral buyer in Kihumba, 23rd July 2010. 
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The case presented above shows that even members of the economic elite on Idjwi Island feel obliged 
to comply with the rules of the traditional system of land tenure. Even though our informant had 
a high-level position with a large national company and even though he was probably capable 
of buying a large piece of land through official procedures - in accordance with the Bakajika 
Law - he realised that, if he wanted to make life easy for himself, he had to respect the authority 
of mwami Rubenga, the man traditionally responsible for the allocation of land-use rights. By 
acknowledging Rubenga’s powerful position and by following the “traditional” procedure for 
acquiring land rights, our informant inserted himself into the local system of patronage. While, 
on the one hand, he confirmed his respect for the supremacy of Rubenga, on the other hand, he 
knew that this gave him the right to rent out parcels of land to (and thus exercise power over) 
people in the artisanal mining industry.
That being said, the case presented below will make it clear that not everyone has been prepared 
to respect the authority of traditional authorities on Idjwi Island. While mwami Rubenga has 
done his best to control the trade in minerals originating from his chieftaincy, the Canadian 
mining company Shamika Resources has tried to start exploration activities on the island, after 
acquiring a number of official permits from the mining registry in Kinshasa. 
small-scale versus large-scale mining: the dispute between comiaK and shamika 
resources
Coopérative Minière et Agricole de Kamole (CoMiaK) presents itself as a cooperative promoting local 
development and defending the interests of people involved in Kamole’s mining and agricultural 
sectors. established in 2007, the organisation has not yet officially been registered, according to the 
head of the mining division of south Kivu.212 CoMiaK has the backing of traditional authorities in the 
area. Mwami Gervais ntawenderundi nkirinayo rubenga iii – the head of the rubenga chieftaincy – 
and prince Lubambo – the head of the bunyakiri groupement - are both represented in the cooperative. 
the two authorities are said to have used their involvement in CoMiaK to monitor the payment of 
customary taxes - in other words, to make sure that everyone working in the mine pays them their 
dues213. 
artisanal miners told ipis that, in the boom period of mineral exploitation on idjwi, CoMiaK imposed 
itself as the sole buyer of minerals from Kamole. as a result, anyone digging for wolframite in the 
mine was forced to accept the price set by the mining cooperative, which was very low. the price 
was kept low deliberately in order to allow a small group of mineral buyers – who maintained close 
relationships with the CoMiaK leadership and with Mwami rubenga iii – to maximise their benefits214.
CoMiaK’s most important buyers were two members of idjwi island’s economic elite,  antoine 
bizimana rutenga and teke Maisha issa. While the former was widely known as the owner of the 
Goma-based buying house amur/Mugote, north Kivu’s biggest mineral exporter in 2008215, the latter 
came into the public eye as a result of his chairmanship of a local organisation for ship owners (chef 
des armateurs). as a member of the bayande clan, teke was reputed to be a close ally of Mwami 
rubenga iii216. he lived in the Kihumba groupement, which was part of the rubenga chieftaincy217. 
in 2007, shamika Congo Kalehe sprL - a subsidiary of the Canadian mining company shamika resources 
inc. - started making moves to acquire eight exploration permits on idjwi. Combined, they covered 70 
212 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 13. according to his own account, 
Mwami rubenga iii tried to obtain an official recognition of CoMiaK from the former governor of south Kivu (source: interview with Mwami 
rubenga iii in bugarula, 24th July 2010). 
213 Mwami rubenga iii’s representatives in CoMiaK are elie barbonera and Mongelo (source: ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de 
Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 8). 
214 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 10. 
215 interview with bizimana (comptoir amur) in Goma, 28th July 2010. 
216 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 11. 
217 interview with police commander in bugarula, 22nd July 2010. 
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percent (or 185 km2) of the island’s total surface area218. shamika’s arrival on the scene caused concern 
among the top players in the mining sector on idjwi island. the mining cooperative CoMiaK played a 
leading role in the protest against shamika219. When a shamika delegation - accompanied by a political 
advisor to the governor of south Kivu as well as by the provincial inspector – came to northern idjwi on 
a preparatory mission, CoMiaK stopped them from completing their tour of the island220.
in an attempt to deal with the shamika affair once and for all, Mwami rubenga iii went to see a 
number of players at the regional and at the national level. first, he paid a visit to the Goma-based 
office of robert Muongo, the director-general of shamika Kalehe. after that, he asked bertin Kaproso, 
the president of idjwi’s mineral buyers and one of the leading figures in the mining cooperative 
CoMiaK, to accompany him on a trip to Kinshasa, in order to verify the legality of shamika’s permits. 
according to his own account, Mwami rubenga iii found out at the Geographical institute (Institut 
Géographique à Kinshasa) that the coordinates on one of shamika’s permits were wrong. apparently, 
the permit pertained to an area in the middle of Lake Kivu, next to the territory of Kalehe221. shamika 
management, however, maintained that all the company’s permits were valid. in december 2007, the 
Canadian law firm heenan blaikie confirmed the validity of the exploration permits as part of a due 
diligence verification exercise commissioned by shamika resources222. 
This case suggests that the local mwami has taken advantage of his key position in the kalinzi system 
to dominate the local mining business. Apart from imposing taxes on most of those involved in 
mining and mining-related activities, he has also used a mining cooperative as a vehicle to channel 
minerals to businessmen within his personal entourage. So, in the period before Shamika’s arrival, 
the artisanal mining business appears to have allowed the mwami to consolidate and strengthen 
an existing system of patronage. 
The case also throws an interesting light on the dynamics of the conflict between small-scale 
and large-scale mining. Interestingly, mwami Rubenga is very much aware of the need to protect 
his clients. Being at the apex of the kalinzi system in the Rubenga chieftaincy, he knows he has 
a moral obligation to shield his clients (COMIAK’s members) from external threats such as the 
exploration activities of the mining company Shamika Resources. Rubenga realises that, in order 
to be able to offer the necessary protection to the people depending on him, he has to mobilise 
all the resources at his disposal, not only at the local level, but also at the provincial and national 
levels. This explains why he would ask for a meeting with the mining company and why he would 
travel all the way to Kinshasa to look for support at the Ministry of Mines.
8.3.4 military involvement in the mining sector
Compared to other territories in South Kivu, Idjwi has an extremely limited number of security 
services. Security is provided by the Naval Forces (forces navales), the Border Police (police des 
frontières) and the Lake Police (police lacustre). Furthermore, the island has a detachment of the 
10th Military Region, which is composed of only 26 soldiers223. They are based in the centre of 
Bunyakiri, a couple of kilometres from the mine of Kamole224. 
Although no soldiers are present at the mining sites, some members of the military and of certain 
police forces do appear to have concluded unofficial mining deals in the past. During the boom 
period (cfr. supra), low-level soldiers were sent to certain mines to supervise pits owned by their 
superiors225.
218 ‘Preliminary assessment and technical report on the Idjwi project for Shamika Resources’, Geodem inc. (2008): p. 5.
219 interview with aprodeped representative in Kamole, 22nd July 2010. 
220 interview with Mwami rubenga iii in bugarula, 24th July 2010. 
221 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi-Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 14. 
222 ‘Preliminary assessment and technical report on the Idjwi project for Shamika Resources’, Geodem inc. (2008): p. 4. 
223 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 5. 
224 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 9. 
225 ‘Rapport sur l’étude menée dans la mine de Kamole à Idjwi Nord’, Justice pour tous, august 2010: p. 9. 
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There have also been reports of soldiers being involved in Idjwi’s illegal charcoal trade. Although 
there has been a ban on logging and timber trading for a couple of years now – to put a stop to 
deforestation – members of the naval forces and their wives are said to have been buying charcoal 
from Pygmy woodcutters since 2003. Soldiers’ spouses have been accused of outmanoeuvring 
their competitors in Bukavu by selling their charcoal far below the normal market prices. In 2006, 
six members of the FARDC were killed in a gunfight in Kintama, in the southern part of Idjwi, 
after getting involved in an argument over the local charcoal trade226.
8.4 conclusions
This chapter on artisanal mining on Idjwi Island has highlighted the important intricacies of 
local power dynamics. Unlike most of the other mining areas in eastern DRC, Idjwi has not been 
plagued by the presence of state and non-state armed groups. Consequently, its mining sector is not 
militarised and there is little risk of mining revenues ending up in the pockets of warlords. Having 
said that, it is important to bear in mind that the absence of armed actors does not automatically 
imply the absence of asymmetrical power relations. The data presented in this chapter shows that 
relationships of patronage and clientelism associated with the kalinzi system have an important 
impact on Idjwi’s artisanal mining business. Idjwi would be an interesting case study for future 
research on the complex relationship between artisanal mining and access to land. 
226 ‘Sud-Kivu: les militaires se muent en vendeurs de braise’, Journal du Citoyen, 17th May 2008; ‘Un sac de braise double de prix à Bukavu’, aCp, 
12th november 2006. 
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chapter 9: from Discourse to practice: a sharper 
perspective on the relationship between minerals 
and violence in Dr congo 
By rachel perks and Koen vlassenroot
9.1 changing views on Drc’s mineral sector
Control over natural resources has taken centre stage in analysing the conflict dynamics in eastern 
DR Congo since the start of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) rebellion 
in 1998. UN Panels of Experts, advocacy groups and civil society organisations have all widely 
documented the involvement of state and non-state armed actors in the exploitation and trade 
of Congo’s natural resources and have called for policy responses, including sanctions on actors 
involved in illegal resource exploitation227. Until 2008-2009, these calls were met with limited 
political support and donor responses. Only recently, almost ten years after the first calls for an 
embargo on the mineral trade, can some policy shifts be observed. Several initiatives promoting 
transparency and traceability of mineral exploitation and trade have been launched and calls have 
been made for legal frameworks prohibiting the import of conflict-related resources. 
An interesting example is the Conflict Minerals Trade Act introduced in the US House of 
Representatives in November 2009. In July 2010, the US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which includes a section on “conflict minerals”228. 
This new act, which has had a considerable impact on current efforts to make the mineral trade 
more transparent, has provoked heated debate between advocacy groups, observers and academic 
researchers. Several advocacy groups have come up with rather simplistic and problematic 
messages, overstating the share of Congo’s resources in the global economy and even suggesting 
a direct link between mining and sexual violence. Another problematic issue with this discourse 
is that it gives the impression that (sexual) violence and conflict are prevailing conditions of all 
mining activities in the DRC, even if many resource-rich regions of the country have been peaceful 
for quite some time.
The campaigns by these advocacy groups, however, have also helped international policymakers 
to deal with Congo’s mining sector more actively. Even if calls for sanctions have been the 
dominant recommendation, recent donor policy shifts have also engendered a number of local 
and regional initiatives aimed at engaging constructively with the complexity of the mining sector, 
both as part of peace-building strategies and the promotion of economic development. There is 
a growing recognition amongst donors, civil society groups and experts that an embargo would 
have far more damaging effects on the social, political and economic landscape of the country 
than strategies to increase transparency, accountability and the formalisation of the mineral 
trade229. The Congolese government has also made some effort and is trying to play a more active 
role in coordinating various initiatives and improving governance conditions in the mining sector, 
even if progress so far is limited230. Equally, there is growing awareness within some levels of the 
227 significant reports documenting the involvement of armed actors in resource exploitation include: the reports by the un panel (2001, 2002 
and 2003) and un Group of experts (2008, 2009); the porter Commission report on ugandan stakes in drC war economy (2002); ‘the curse 
of gold’, human rights Watch (2005); ‘under-mining peace: tin – the explosive trade in cassiterite in eastern drC’, Global Witness (2005)) 
228 according to this act, companies reporting to the securities and exchange Commission (seC) - that is, companies with more than us$10 
million in assets and more than 500 owners - will have to file periodic reports disclosing their use of what is defined as “conflict minerals” 
(gold, coltan, cassiterite and wolframite as well as their derivates) in the production or functionality of any products originated in the drC 
or an adjoining country (resource Consulting services, private sector guidance on the dodd-frank act section 1502, september 2010). the 
seC has to publish regulations about this reporting requirement by april 2011.
229 see bsr: http://blogs.reuters.com/environment/2010/08/private-sectors-role-in-reducing-the-use-of-conflict-minerals/; the us state 
department: http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2010/143784.htm and pole institute: http://www.pole-institute.org/site%20web/echos/
echo114.htm
230 in september 2010, president Kabila announced a temporary suspension of mineral exports from the Kivu provinces. 
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mining industry, demonstrated by the development of a number of strategies aimed at promoting 
traceability of minerals exploited in eastern DRC. 
These dynamics are all aimed at improving governance of the mining sector, demilitarising the 
largely artisanal mineral trade and bringing it into the formal economy. In order to be successful, 
observers and participants need to adopt a more nuanced perspective on the relationship between 
mineral resource extraction and conflict than the dominant view of what is generally understood 
as “conflict resources”231. This stance does not adequately explain the current artisanal mining 
landscape and tends to emphasise security issues. This chapter illustrates some of the current 
misperceptions about the larger context of mineral exploitation and trade, and evaluates how 
these perceptions impact international and national engagements in DR Congo’s mineral sector.
9.2 minerals Drive Drc’s violent conflicts: reality or myth? 
From the start of the second Congolese war in 1998, natural resources assumed centre stage in the 
debate and analysis on violence and war in the DRC. Several advocacy groups published reports 
on armed actors’ involvement in the extraction of minerals in eastern DR Congo, but the issue 
was first documented for the wider world with the publication of the UN Panel of Experts’ reports 
in March and November 2001. 
Since then, numerous reports have been published in which economic incentives have consistently 
been put forward as a dominant cause of the protracted Congolese conflict and its fragmented 
military landscape. Some have claimed that the self-financing nature of the Congolese wars has 
led to a mutation in the character of violence but simultaneously engendered criminalisation of 
warfare, as rebel movements have increasingly engaged in illegal economic activities and linked 
up with informal transnational networks to export locally generated resources. Others have tried 
to demonstrate that international competition for scarce resources - such as coltan, gold and 
timber - was one of the main primary causes for the lack of state stability and prolonged violence 
in eastern DRC.232
Although the involvement of armed actors (and their proxies) in mining activities both during 
the war and the post-conflict period cannot be neglected, the prevailing perception of this issue 
lacks a nuanced understanding of the complex interaction between resources and conflict. This is 
partly the result of a lack of empirical data on conditions in the mining centres and local trading 
networks (only a limited number of cases have been publicly well-documented so far) but also of 
the different advocacy strategies that have provided influential yet simplistic views on the direct 
links between violence and resources. When analysing predominant views of Congo’s mining 
sector, several misperceptions can be identified.
Firstly, even if in DRC natural resources have tended to influence armed actors’ strategies, it is 
seldom recognised that military control over the exploitation and trading of natural resources 
is an outcome, rather than a cause, of the conflict. In relation to this, there is a tendency to 
generalise the different strategies behind armed actors’ involvement in resource exploitation. 
Also, distinctions should be made between activities that relate to the production, mobilisation 
and allocation of economic resources aimed at waging and sustaining war, and activities that 
are conducted outside state-regulated frameworks but are not necessarily directly linked to 
231 Global Witness defines conflict resources as ‘natural resources whose systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute 
to, benefit from or result in the commission of serious violations of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law or violations 
amounting to crimes under international law’. the new us legislation defines conflict minerals as either (a) coltan, cassiterite, gold, 
wolframite, or their derivatives; or (b) any other mineral or its derivatives that is ‘financing conflict in the democratic republic of the Congo 
or an adjoining country’.
232 ‘negotiated peace for extortion: the case of Walikale territory in eastern dr Congo’, nicholas Garrett & sylvia sergiou & Koen vlassenroot, 
in: Journal of Eastern Afridan Studies, vol. 3, nr. 1: pp. 1-21. 
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armed strategies. Each economy offers different incentive systems and has its own quirks and 
logic, which are important to understand when developing appropriate policy responses. So a 
distinction needs to be made between the position and strategies of a digger, who depends on 
the exploitation and commercialisation of mineral resources for his subsistence; an unlicensed 
buyer, who smuggles his commodities to neighbouring countries in order to circumvent export 
charges; and an armed actor using force to gain control over local resources as part of a strategy 
to wield political and economic power (and who is able to do so partly because of the way the 
local economy is structured around patronage networks and informal systems, with little formal 
involvement of the Congolese state).
Secondly, there is a lack of understanding of the different grades of relationship between armed 
actors and minerals. Empirical data reveals that a wide spectrum of resource extraction scenarios 
have been functioning with varying degrees of influence on conflict dynamics in eastern DRC. 
Not all these scenarios involve armed actors nor do they all engender conflict. The dominant 
perception, however, is that in most cases, there is direct military control over mining sites. This is 
despite the fact that the implication of armed groups is usually limited to predatory behaviour or 
the imposition of taxes at exit points or trading routes. Documented cases - such as the cassiterite 
trade in Bisie (Walikale), where armed actors are directly involved in exploitation activities - tend 
to be generalised to eastern DRC’s entire mining sector, even if the case studies provided in this 
report suggest a more sophisticated and less direct link between minerals and conflict dynamics. It 
is not possible to adequately unravel the role of the mineral trade in armed actors’ strategies and 
power positions in eastern Congo without more systematic documentation of local conditions 
and trading mechanisms in the mining centres. 
Thirdly, it is important to document and understand the particular mechanisms of the trade at the 
lower levels of the commodity chain as well as the sociopolitical dynamics that govern artisanal 
mining sites in eastern Congo. Several reports and studies have documented organisational patterns 
of artisanal and small-scale production, but far less is known about governance and the power 
structures that condition the position of middlemen and miners. This would include agreements 
between miners and security forces, for example. Different interests are at play and attract a wide 
variety of actors, not just armed groups. It is important to acknowledge that governance vacuums to 
the advantage of parallel structures under the control of armed actors have not come about merely 
because of the existence of armed groups as such, also because of the marginal presence and weak 
performance of official governance structures on mining sites. A widely illustrated case at hand is the 
cassiterite sector in Walikale. Here, FARDC units have imposed their own predatory mechanisms. 
But in other cases, too, where state representatives remain largely absent, armed actors have been 
able to institute their own mechanisms of control and exploitation.
9.3 Donor responses: a Brief Description and observations 
Growing awareness of the sector’s complexities (as mentioned in the introduction) is slowly 
leading to a paradigm shift by donors and some international development agencies. Whilst focus 
on economic incentives for armed actors and the consequences on security conditions continue to 
preoccupy policy perspectives and approaches, mineral resources are no longer viewed merely as 
a security concern but also as an opportunity for peace and development. This can be observed in 
major donors’ changing country strategies and project rationales 233. In summary, these strategies 
and rationales argue that responsible resource management can contribute to peacebuilding and 
economic stability in DRC. In response, some donors, regional organisations and the private 
sector have initiated new projects to favour the promotion of legal resource exploitation and 
trade by strengthening state capacity, implementing transparency mechanisms and certification 
schemes, and promoting regional inter-governmental cooperation. 
233 see the british, German, belgian, and united states drC country strategies in particular.
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Within this widening range of donor initiatives in eastern Congo, interventions focus broadly on 
the following themes:
Traceability and certification aiming to address sourcing transparency for industry actors and 
Governments. Initiatives by and large respond to increased advocacy pressure regarding armed/
illicit mineral extraction with most project development and implementation not starting until 
2009. Donors, along with industry players, are piloting various traceability schemes to improve 
transparency of the extraction and trade chain from “mine to market”. Examples include the 
Centres de Négoce project under joint management of the Ministry of Mines and MONUC/
MONUSCO that forms part of the eastern DRC Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC); 
the regional certification mechanism being proposed by the International Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region (ICGLR) whereby the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) is seeking to pilot due diligence criteria234; the Global e-Sustainability Initiative; the 
industry-led ITRI initiative on due diligence with pilot projects; and the GTZ-funded BGR project 
for “finger printing” to identify a mineral’s geographic origin. 
Several observations can be made about these pilot projects. First, there is a low level of consultation 
with some of the most important actors in the supply chain: traders and artisanal miners. Both 
play a crucial role in the artisanal mining sector: the former constituting the bridge between 
producers (artisanal miners) and industry buyers (both national and international) and the latter 
constituting the production workforce and those most economically and socially affected by 
current practices and new proposed transparency standards. Each needs to play a major reform 
role in contextualising, implementing and monitoring proposed standards and criteria, though 
few initiatives to date have sought comprehensive contributions from these groups. Secondly, 
investment in skills development for local organisations to play an implementing and monitoring 
role for these various initiatives has not yet been done adequately. Thirdly, these traceability and 
certification schemes rely heavily on government presence and capacity to perform functions. 
There is an inherent assumption made by most donors that DRC government officials already 
have the capacity, resources and incentives needed to perform their role. This, by and large, is 
not the case, especially in the outlying mine areas where most of these initiatives occur. Fourthly, 
whilst most initiatives have a security remit, they focus only on disassociating mining from armed 
groups other than the FARDC, which has not been included in their efforts. The OECD’s due 
diligence criteria may be the first step in widening the definition of conflict and armed group 
behaviour at mine sites, though they are yet to be finalised235.
Mine sector reform with a focus on government capacity. Some donors are implementing 
institutional capacity-building programmes with different government ministries concerned 
with fiscal and technical monitoring of the mining sector. Examples include technical support 
from GTZ to the Congolese government for EITI implementation, and Promines, an overall 
mining sector reform programme with support from the World Bank and UK Department for 
International Development (DFID). GTZ support to the Ministry of Finance - an essential ministry 
for managing revenue from both the large-scale and small-scale mine industry – is particularly 
noteworthy. Equally noteworthy is the breadth and scope of Promines and its recognition of the 
artisanal mining sector as an important area of focus. 
Regional cooperation with a view to improving cross-border trade controls. Although this has 
received less attention than the initiatives detailed above, a few projects have been developed to 
deal with the regional dimension of the mineral trade. Economic conditions in most of eastern 
DRC are determined by regional dynamics, since the informal mining sector is largely oriented 
234 the ‘Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Supply Chain Management of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High Risk Areas’. 
235 at the end of september 2010 a range of actors discussed in nairobi the proposed criteria and the feasibility of their implementation in 
complex mining areas such as eastern Congo.
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towards East African markets236 and regional actors have considerable stakes in this sector. 
COMESA, in partnership with DFID, has worked in the past with border officials and their trade 
offices to improve the efficiency of these important border posts. Other initiatives have a more 
political mandate and aim to promote peace and security through enhanced regional cooperation. 
In October 2006, the ICGLR initiated its ‘regional initiative against illegal exploitation of natural 
resources’, to strengthen regional capacity for increased transparency in trade in natural resources. 
A number of instruments are currently being developed as part of this initiative, including the one 
on traceability and certification mentioned above. At a Nairobi meeting in September 2010, the 
11 ICGLR member states discussed the adoption of a certification system.
Community security and risk mitigation to put environmental conditions in place for the benefits of 
mining to be properly harnessed for the country’s long-term economic development. The US State 
Department recently revealed its intention to back implementation of the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights237 (VPSHR) in artisanal mining sites in eastern Congo, with a view 
to improving army and police behaviour, and increasing risk and conflict mitigation for local 
community actors at mine sites238. These principles focus on three main areas of human rights 
vulnerability in the extractive industry: 1) managing private security relations; 2) managing public 
security relations; and 3) conflict and risk assessment. The latter stresses the role of community 
groups and representatives in analysing potential risks and conflicts resulting from extractive 
activities in their local environment. VPSHR implementation in DRC has traditionally focused 
on large-scale mining company implementation. This programme would be a first for artisanal 
mining communities in the country. 
The potential support for reforming mine site security practice, and broadening its conception to 
include community involvement, would constitute an important step towards more peaceful mine 
practice. Representatives of various public security bodies often operate on sites, competing for 
legitimacy and mandate. This competition generally causes confusion, and breeds an environment 
in which informal taxation and other corrupt practices flourish. Furthermore, conflict dynamics, 
are often specific to each environment, but this is rarely considered by outside actors designing 
interventions. Thus, efforts to improve local conflict analysis and risk mitigation involving active 
community participation could facilitate more transparent information-sharing, and ultimately, 
generate greater trust amongst everyone involved in the mining industry. 
Two final overall observations are worth making on this changing landscape of donor 
interventions. Firstly, a considerable level of coordination is evident amongst donors and the 
DRC government on resource issues at the national level. As mentioned above, Promines is one 
framework addressing a range of reform issues and is encouraging other donors to contribute 
towards its broad objectives rather than establishing parallel initiatives. The DRC government is 
also actively managing the Groupe Thematique on mining, bringing all interested donors together 
on one common platform. 
These national level coordination efforts, however, are largely absent in most of the outlying 
provinces where project implementation occurs. This has several potential impacts for work on 
the ground: duplication of similar projects by different donors and partners, leading to inefficient 
use of financial and human resources; confusion amongst local and international stakeholders 
about who is doing what and with which mandate; and pockets of impact that may not contribute 
towards a wider overall objective.
Secondly, a key piece of the overall peace-building and economic recovery agenda is largely being 
overlooked. While most donors have chosen to focus on the link between conflict, security and 
236 vast deposits of minerals exploited in north Kivu, south Kivu, orientale, northern Katanga and Maniema are transited or traded in rwanda, 
burundi, uganda or tanzania.
237 see http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/
238 see http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2010/143784.htm
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mining in eastern Congo, this scenario represents a tiny percentage of actual mining practice. In 
fact, by and large, the mining sector of DRC operates in relative peace. Not enough research, 
documentation and work has been done to understand the conditions under which peaceful mining 
has occurred. Nor have significant efforts been made to support peaceful mine environments 
to improve working conditions, the social impact of mining, and economic revenues. These 
fundamental improvements to the sector would undoubtedly have an important impact on 
the lives of millions of people who depend on this economic activity, and thus promote local 
development across the eastern provinces of DRC.
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chapter 10: general conclusions
By Jason stearns
10.1 introduction
The various case studies in this report paint a nuanced picture of mineral supply chains in the 
Kivus and Ituri. They should inform our analysis of the trade, as well as policy initiatives aimed 
at reforming the sector to promote transparency and boost livelihoods. Below, we outline several 
thematic challenges raised by the case studies, in particular, land tenure arrangements, the links 
between conflict and mining, and the difficulty of implementing due diligence initiatives. 
In general, the case studies demonstrate that any reform of the mining sector needs to consider 
its location within the political and social context of eastern Congo. If reform initiatives do not 
take these complexities into account, they may fail to achieve their objectives. Some of the main 
challenges highlighted by these case studies are:
• The difficulty of implementing due diligence initiatives, such as those mandated by recent US 
legislation, given the relative absence of documentation for mineral origin in the Kivus and 
the weakness of state institutions in general;
• The particular elusiveness of the gold trade, which could well be much larger in value than the 
more reported cassiterite trade, but is much harder to regulate, given how easy it is to smuggle 
gold across borders and evade regulation;
• The overlapping civil and customary jurisdictions with regards to both land and mining, which 
is a symptom of the weakness of state capacity. Reform efforts, however, need to bear in mind 
that customary chiefs have vested interests in their own right and are also representatives of 
local communities, who are suspicious of state efforts to regulate artisanal mining;
10.2 land Tenure and administrative capacity 
One of the most important questions raised by these case studies is: Who manages mining in 
the eastern Congo? In theory, industrial mining is regulated at the national level by the Ministry 
of Mines and the Mining Registry (cadastre minier) in Kinshasa. Artisanal mining permits are 
granted at the provincial level by the Mining Ministry’s local representatives and the sector is 
regulated by SAESSCAM, a state agency. The Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de Certification 
(CEEC) is involved in assessing the quality of the minerals and certifying their origin. 
The reality, as these case studies spell out, is very different. The case studies on Idjwi, Nyabibwe 
and Bisie show clearly that customary authorities still play a significant role in managing land 
tenure and mining rights. Even where civil authorities have been able to assert their control, 
corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency has undermined the artisanal mining sector. This has 
rendered the trade opaque and has contributed to conflict by allowing competing interest groups 
to use bribery and intimidation to secure their claims. 
Some of this confusion is due to the bifurcated administration of land in which customary and 
civil authorities vie for dominance. A brief history of Congo’s land tenure laws is instructive. 
During the pre-colonial period, different systems of customary tenure dominated, often – but 
not always – giving the customary chief ultimate power over allocating land. During the colonial 
period, the Belgian government deemed that all “vacant” land could be expropriated by the state, 
thereby allowing the colonial government to claim up to 12 million hectares of the most fertile 
and valuable land. 
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Six years after independence, the Bakajika Law gave ownership of all wealth above and below 
the ground to the state, thus ensuring that the government could claim all public mineral rights. 
In December 1971, a constitutional amendment and a new law empowered the state to repossess 
all rights to the land. In July 1973, the General Property Law was enacted to organise the 
country’s new land law system. The 1971 and 1973 laws gave the state the rights over all land, 
with individual land rights derived either from concessions by the state or through indigenous 
customary law. 
The new laws did not abrogate pre-existing customary land rights, but they left the future 
concessionary status of these lands unclear. President Mobutu was supposed to issue a decree 
clarifying the status of customary rulers and land tenure, never did. As a result, while most of 
the land in the eastern Congo is governed by customary tenure - although in some areas which 
became plantation economies during the colonial era (like the highlands of Masisi) much of the 
land has been officially registered to large landowners – their claims to land are tenuous and they 
can be expropriated by the state at will. It is important also to note that customary tenure can 
be just as contentious and open to abuse as the civil system, especially given the contested rule of 
many customary chiefs. 
The case of the Kihumba mine on Idjwi shows that large concessions of land can be purchased 
from the state, but the owner will still have to pay tribute to the local customary chief if s/he 
wants to avoid trouble. Confusing matters further, the property owner holds the lease for the 
land, but – according to the Bakajika law – should not be able to control or earn revenues from 
the minerals in the soil, which belong to the Congolese state. Similarly, customary authorities 
have influenced power struggles over mines in Nyabibwe and Bisie, rallying artisanal miners and 
administrative officials behind their cause with violent consequences.
The Shabunda case study illustrates the erratic and contradictory nature of local regulation of the 
mineral trade. Even basic information, such as where mines are located and what kind of minerals 
they produce, is sometimes missing from provincial records. Minerals often only show up on 
official records at transit point, which makes it easy to mask the origin of the minerals. Frequently, 
minerals do not show up at all, as they are smuggled across the border into neighbouring countries. 
The case of gold is the most egregious: Up to $160 million in gold could be smuggled out of South 
Kivu each year.  
It is obvious that this lack of contractual security discourages investors, but the problems are 
more far-reaching. Administrative weakness has rendered the sector opaque, as different state 
agencies report different amounts of mineral exports. This undermines revenue collection, makes 
it difficult to understand the dynamics of the trade and challenges any supply chain due diligence 
efforts. 
In addition, the lack of clarity over mining rights can lead to violent conflict, illustrated by the case in 
the Bisie mine in Walikale and to a lesser degree by that of the Nyabibwe mine. The involvement of 
individuals with close past connections to armed groups could also be a liability to the mineral trade. 
If the east opens up to industrial mining, they could be cut out of the business but retain their links to 
mining cooperatives and armed groups. The Bisie case also highlights the involvement of Congolese 
army officers in mining and suggests that it is not enough to exclude rebel groups from the minerals 
trade – efforts must extend to Congolese army units too  especially abusive ones.239 
A solution to this nebulous management of the mining sector is in part to strengthen the 
administration apparatus, including through better training, more staff, data management and 
239 according to the Congolese military penal code, soldiers are not permitted to benefit from the mineral trade and should therefore never 
be present in mines. however, in exceptional cases where rebel groups are close, national army units may be required to protect the mine, 
although special care should be taken to prevent any profiteering. 
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internal audits and oversight mechanisms. In particular, as the UN Group of Experts suggested, a 
special cell should be set up within the military prosecutor’s office to investigate officers guilty of 
profiting from the minerals trade.
As these institutional reforms will take time, it is important for the Congolese state to provide 
incentives for traders to formalise their trade. First and foremost, this means drastically reducing 
export taxes on cassiterite and gold in order to give traders an incentive not to smuggle their 
goods out to Rwanda and Uganda, from where they do not pay any export taxes. Specific tax 
breaks and security incentives should also be provided for traders to register their goods as close 
to the original mine as possible, which would make the supply chain more transparent. At the 
same time, donors should help the Congolese government strengthen customs agreements with its 
neighbours to clamp down on smuggling and fraud. 
The gold trade provides a particularly difficult challenge. Gold can be smuggled out of the country 
in a suitcase, evading customs control and any certification. While the centre de négoce might 
provide some incentive to traders to formalise this trade, they are still located far from the mining 
sites and, according to testimonies provided in this report, have not provided enough incentives 
for traders to declare their gold. Strong monitoring mechanisms will ultimately be the only way 
to prevent fraud and abuse in this sector. The case study on South Kivu and Burundi provided 
here, as well as UN Group of Experts reports, show that it is possible to uncover the hidden gold 
economy and target fraudulent traders. 
10.3 De-linking conflict and mining
Not all mines in the Kivus are militarised, as the Idjwi and Nyabibwe examples demonstrate. 
However, armed groups – especially the Congolese army – tax the vast majority of minerals in 
the Kivus at some point in the supply chain. Military involvement is complex and often relatively 
sophisticated. Soldiers can “rent” out mining pits, tax minerals along trade routes and help 
smuggle them across the border in return for a pay-off. In some cases, armed groups and army 
officers have helped set up trading companies and benefited in a more corporate fashion from the 
trade, using their military influence to secure valuable concessions and facilitate exports. 
The link between conflict and mining is not always obvious. When military control over an area 
is stable, observers will see taxation but rarely conflict, as there are no other armed groups to 
challenge the incumbent’s control. However, the revenues from mining provide a steady stream 
of revenues to non-state armed groups, which makes them harder to eradicate and encourages 
unemployed youth to join their ranks. For the national army, patronage linked to mining areas 
can lead to infighting and corrodes the already fragile discipline among soldiers and officers. In 
addition, taxation of miners and traders can be a brutal protection racket and is often accompanied 
by intimidation and violence. Finally, there have been obvious cases where two or more armed 
groups have battled over mining areas, leading to civilian casualties. 
Any successful efforts to de-link armed groups from the mineral trade need to be just as sophisticated 
as the military’s involvement. As the case studies indicate, many mining pits in eastern Congo are 
not under the transparent control of government agents. Minerals from hundreds of mining pits 
in Shabunda and Fizi, for example, are not registered until they reach commercial centres, often 
dozens of kilometres from the mines. ITRI and the Congolese government and their partners have 
begun to set up a pilot certification scheme in a few select mines in North and South Kivu, but this 
still leaves much of the mineral trade unregulated. Even in those mines where certification is being 
carried out, the current scheme will not record influence of soldiers either at the mine or along the 
trade route. Congolese organisations have also expressed concern that fraudulent traders could 
bribe or coerce their way into having their minerals certified as “conflict-free.” 
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As due diligence hinges on knowing the source of minerals, and that hinges on some sort of 
certification or transparent recordkeeping, there are serious doubts whether either process will 
yield significant fruits in the near future if there is no radical reform of the mining sector in eastern 
Congo. Investigative mechanisms to detect and prosecute illegal activities, such as knowingly 
buying from rebel-controlled areas, could help in this regard, as they would not seek to certify 
every single bag of minerals – an impossible task – but only to police the sector and catch offenders. 
This would provide incentives for traders to stop buying “tainted” minerals. 
A healthy dose of scepticism should, however, accompany this approach. The complicity between 
armed groups and traders is already fairly well documented - by IPIS, the UN Group of Experts, 
Pole Institute, OGP and Global Witness - but no action has been taken by either the Congolese 
government or the UN Security Council to sanction those involved. 
There is still space for optimism, however. Pressure is mounting on companies in Europe and 
the United States to stop buying “conflict minerals” from the Congo. Even though it is difficult 
at the moment for any trader to know which minerals have contributed to conflict, several 
companies have simply decided not to take the risk and to stop buying. In addition, banks have 
suspended lines of credit to major tin traders to prevent damage to their reputations. This has 
led to a decrease in tin exports from eastern Congo. While this has had a negative impact on the 
livelihoods of miners and traders, and transferred some of the trade to countries that care less 
about reputational damage, there are some initial signs that it is also prompting the business 
sector to ask for demilitarisation of the sector. 
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